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The fundamental goal of securities law is to make markets 
more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby 
reducing asymmetric information.! The fundamental goal of 
corporation law is to cause managers to govern for the benefit 
of the firm and its investors.2 The fundamental goal of credit 
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1. Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Pol-
icy: Evaluating the SEC's Role in International Securities Regulation, 32 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 210 n.4 (1998) (noting that "[b]y imposing anti-fraud 
and disclosure requirements... , the Commission preserves marketwide 
transparency and, hence, fosters efficient domestic securities markets"); Mar-
cel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 
1992 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (observing that "[t]he compliance effort is rational-
ized, to a significant degree, by one principal goal of securities laws: to create 
stock markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its funda-
mental value"); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges 
and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 17, 31 (1999) (arguing that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) "has long believed that transparency ... plays a fundamental 
role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets ... and improves 
the price discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. mar-
kets"). 
2. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm 
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1326 
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rating agencies is to provide ratings that accurately inform in-
vestors of the likelihood of timely payment on a firm's bonds. 
This Article argues that these goals are, at best, imperfectly 
achieved because of the conflict between current and future in-
vestors3 (hereinafter, the "temporal conflict"4), and the different 
perspectives that conflict creates-not only confusing the inves-
tor audience within each of these areas of law, but also creating 
inconsistent obligations to investors across these areas. An un-
derstanding of the temporal conflict also reveals that wide-
spread perceptions of corporate wrongdoing can be misleading 
where corporate actions taken ex ante to benefit one investor 
group inadvertently harm another investor group ex post. 5 
This Article's purpose is both positive arid normative: to 
explain the temporal conflict and its attendant problems, and 
to help resolve the conflict by analyzing, in each case, who 
should be included in the relevant audience. Because my analy-
sis focuses on the inherently clashing perspectives of current 
and future investors,6 it is fundamentally different from the fo-
(1992) (observing that "the fundamental goal of corporate law is so theoreti-
cally and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the goal is to 
maximize corporate-and thus shareholder-welfare''). 
3. "Current investors" of a firm at any given time are those who, at such 
time, hold securities of the firm. "Future investors" of a firm at any given time 
are those who do not, at such time-but who do at a later time-hold securi-
ties of the firm. For example, if at a given time Investor X holds securities of 
Firm Y, Investor X would be a current investor at that time in Firm Y. Simi-
larly, if at a given time Investor W holds no securities of Firm Y but later 
holds securities of Firm Y, Investor W would be a future investor at that time 
in Firm Y. The term "future investors" thus includes only those who in fact 
later invest in securities of the firm at issue, and does not include those who 
may later invest but do not in fact do so, no matter how likely that later in-
vestment was. 
The temporal conflict is not between types of investors per se, but between 
current and future investors of any given type. Examples include the conflict 
between current and future shareholders, or between current and future 
bondholders. 
4. Although this Article uses the term "temporal conflict," the conflict 
also could be described as "inter-temporal" or "intertemporal." Cf. Henry T.C. 
Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and 
the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (1991) (charac-
terizing this conflict as one of "pronounced intertemporal dimensions"). 
5. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
6. The actual identity of the current and future investors is irrelevant to 
my analysis of the temporal conflict so long as-as would be expected-there 
are at least some current investors and future investors who are different at 
any given point in time. The fact that future investors eventually become cur-
rent investors is thus not determinative. See infra note 59. Similarly, the type 
of investors to whom directors are obligated (e.g., shareholders, creditors) is 
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cus of existing scholarship, which examines second-order dis-
tinctions resulting from the conflicting goals of current long-
and short-term investors. 7 That is a more tractable conflict be-
cause the investor audience is known. In contrast, few courts or 
commentators have ever grappled with the temporal conflict, 
making it virtually an issue of first impression.8 
This Article ultimately argues for a second-best solution to 
the temporal conflict: proposing that firms should err against 
disclosure in cases of ambiguity. This solution, I show, would be 
less costly to investors, issuers, and markets than existing dis-
closure strategies. This solution also could help resolve the 
broader debate over how to minimize the ambiguity of disclo-
sure in securities law.9 
INTRODUCTION 
To understand the temporal conflict, consider the dilemma 
of disclosure. By disclosing risks, a firm's management reduces, 
and ideally eliminates, the information asymmetry between the 
firm and investors in the firm's securities. There is little ques-
tion that a clear and credible risk must be disclosed.10 Disclo-
sure, however, involves probabilities and difficult judgment 
choices, and often is ambiguous (hereinafter "disclosure ambi-
guity,,): 
irrelevant to my analysis, which focuses on the temporal conflict between cur-
rent and future investors of any given type. See supra note 3. 
7. For a detailed discussion of how these conflicts differ, see infra notes 
55-58 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra Part 1 (Relevant Legal Precedents). 1 have discussed the 
temporal conflict with several top securities law professors and regulators, 
and--even though they agree this is an interesting and important issue--they 
are not aware of any other precedent. See, e.g., Letter from Eric T. Spink, Ca-
nadian Barrister and Solicitor and former Vice-Chair, Alberta [Canada] Secu-
rities Commission, to the author 3 (June 28, 2004) (on file with the Minnesota 
Law Review) (observing that "I am not aware of any scholarly review of the 
'conflict' between current and future investors but 1 can attest to the fact that 
it was already a long-standing issue in Canada in 1988 (when I first encoun-
tered it)"). 1 will pay a $100 reward to anyone finding a significant precedent 
that might have been missed in this research! For conjecture on why there are 
so few precedents, see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (explaining 
that low historical turnover levels in holdings of securities reduced the tempo-
ral conflict's significance, whereas recent financial innovation has dramati-
cally increased turnover levels and thus the conflict's significance). 
9. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. 
10. 1 later discuss when the duty to disclose arises, and conclude that the 
timing of disclosure is neutral to this Article's analysis. See infra note 16. 
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Many pages of judicial and scholarly ink have been spent assessing 
the conceptual or contextual importance or significance of a wide va-
riety of facts and events, the nature of a "reasonable shareholder" or 
"reasonable investor," and the composition of a "total mix" of informa-
tion, among other things, in order to determine whether a particular 
fact is or was required to be disclosed. Unfortunately, however, appli-
cable decisional law and scholarship often do not permit a definitive 
determination as to the materiality of facts or events, even if recur-
ring. Jl 
If a risk is possible though unlikely, should management 
disclose it?12 If the risk should be disclosed, how prominently 
11. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of In-
sider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1152-53 (2003) (ob-
serving also that the materiality standard's "interpretation and application 
(both as a general matter and in specific factual scenarios) often are not 
clear"); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) 
("[T]he determination of materiality [and thus the obligation to disclose] ... 
requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' 
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to 
him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact."); Hemin-
way, supra, at 1149 ("[T]he law addresses only two options-'material' and 
'not material.' Unfortunately, application of the current standard for determin-
ing materiality frequently yields a third result-'possibly material.' ... If only 
materiality were as precise a sorting device as the [Harry Potteresque] Hog-
warts Sorting Hat .... "); E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer 
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina (at Chapel Hill), to the author 
1 (Mar. 28, 2004) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (observing that "the 
cases are all over the place regarding materiality and soft information''). 
12. Federal securities law in the United States generally attempts to ad-
dress this problem by requiring disclosure of risk through a probability-
magnitude approach, according to which the materiality of a contingent or 
speculative event would depend on balancing the probability of the event oc-
curring and the anticipated magnitude of the event's impact on the condition 
of the firm. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)). If the resulting fac-
tor is small, theoretically the market will disregard the risk or minimally dis-
count the securities. The temporal conflict would be interesting but not neces-
sarily problematic in the United States if firms were precisely able to gage the 
probability and magnitude of risks and investors were able to disregard or dis-
count disclosed risks in a perfectly rational manner. The former is not realistic 
and, as this Article will discuss, investors are rarely so rational. See infra 
notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing behavioral psychology). Note 
also that a firm's Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure, 
discussed infra note 28, is subject to a slightly different disclosure standard. 
See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Re-
sults of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989) (clarify-
ing that the MD&A "mandates disclosure of specified forward-looking informa-
tion, and specifies its own standard for disclosure-i.e., reasonably likely to 
have a material effect"). Professors Donald C. Langevoort and Troy A. Paredes 
suggest that this different MD&A standard "reflects concern that using mate-
riality as the threshold for an affirmative obligation to disclose forward-
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should it be disclosed?13 These questions raise an inherent di-
lemma: disclosure of a possible risk harms a firm's current in-
vestors, and the more prominent the disclosure, the greater 
their harm.14 On the .other hand, failure to disclose the risk, or 
to give sufficient prominence to the disclosure, may harm the 
firm's future investors.15 On which audience should disclosure 
be focused?16 
looking information would encourage excessive disclosure." Troy A. Paredes, 
Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 449 (2003) (referring to Donald C. 
Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced 
Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 775 (1997». 
13. For example, for disclosure on the firm's financial statements, should 
the risk be disclosed as a liability or merely in the footnotes to the financial 
statements as a contingency? C{. infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text 
(discussing that question in connection with the adequacy of Enron's disclo-
sure). 
14. Although disclosure alerts current investors to the possibility of opting 
out of their investment based on the risk disclosed, a decision to opt out is as 
likely to be wrong as right where there is disclosure ambiguity. Moreover, 
even where opting out is the right decision, those investors still would be 
harmed to the extent the disclosure reduces the sales price of their securities 
before they have the chance to sell. Although some investors, such as day 
traders, might be able to sell before the price drops, most of a firm's current 
investors will not. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price 
Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 7, 21 (1994) (stating that prices of "widely held and heavily 
traded securities" appear to "promptly incorporate relevant public informa-
tion"). One reviewer of this Article nonetheless argues that "that price reduc-
tion will be moderated by the possibility that the risk will ultimately pass 
without negatively affecting the issuer [whereas] [i]f the ambiguous risk is not 
disclosed until it becomes more obviously material, the price reduction or 
'harm' will be greater and more surprising." Letter from Eric T. Spink to au-
thor, supra note 8, at 1. Ultimate passing of the risk will not, however, lessen 
the harm to those current investors who sell their securities after the price 
drops but before the risk passes. Furthermore, in cases where the ambiguous 
risk later becomes "more obviously material," there is no basis to believe, as 
former Vice-Chairman Spink contends, that the price reduction absent earlier 
ambiguous disclosure will be greater than the price reduction with such dis-
closure: the latter necessarily must take into account both the price reduction 
caused by the ambiguous disclosure and the additional price reduction caused 
by later disclosure that the once-ambiguous risk is now more obviously mate-
rial. 
15. And the less prominent the disclosure, the greater the potential harm 
to those investors. 
16. This Article previously indicated, supra note 3, that current investors 
of a firm are those who, at any given time, hold securities of the firm, while 
future investors of a firm are those who do not, at such time-but who do at a 
later time-hold securities of the firm. Because, as discussed in the text above, 
the consequences of the temporal conflict are most pronounced in the disclo-
sure context, the relevant time is likely to be a time that disclosure is legally 
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Corporation law suggests the audience should be current 
investors. Directors and management, at least in the United 
States, have a fiduciary duty only to investors holding an exist-
ing property right or equitable interest to support such a 
duty-i.e., current investors.17 Presumably, then, in case of 
doubt, management should err on the side of less prominent 
disclosure of risk because that helps current investors preserve 
the value oftheir investments.18 
Management, however, also must comply with securities 
law. In theory, securities law appears less explicitly cognizant 
of temporal distinctions and mostly concerned with disclosure 
for the sake of market efficiency, to be achieved through full 
disclosure of material information which, in turn, would allow 
required. Under the securities law of the United States, there is no general 
ongoing duty to disclose material information. MARc I. STEINBERG, 
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw 287 (3d ed. 2001) (noting "there currently is 
no general afflrmative duty to disclose even material information regarding 
the issuer except in certain speciflc circumstances"). An issuer has a duty to 
disclose all material information at the time of issuing securities, and also at 
the time of flling each of its quarterly and annual periodic reports. [d. at 286--
87. The issuer also may have a continuous ongoing duty to update a previously 
made statement that has become materially false or misleading as a result of 
subsequent events. [d. at 285. In other legal systems, such as Australia, there 
may be a continuous ongoing duty to disclose material information. See Aus· 
TRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE, CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE: THE AUSTRALIAN 
EXPERIENCE 5 (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.asx.com.aulshareholder/pdflcon 
tinuousdisclosure-theaustexperience.pdf (stating that ASX Listing Rule 3.1 
requires companies to disclose information that a reasonable person would ex-
pect would have a material effect on the price or value of the corporation's se-
curities). The fact that different legal systems may require disclosure at differ-
ent times, however, is neutral to my analysis. 
17. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (citing Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988». But cf. 
Gaiman v. Nat'l Ass'n for Mental Health, 3 W.L.R. 42, 54 (Ch. 1970) (holding, 
as a matter of U.K. company law, that management has a flduciary duty to 
''both present and future members [i.e., shareholders],,). 
18. Several reviewers observed that, for some current investors-
speciflcally shareholders and others with rights and powers regarding corpo-
rate governance-disclosure would not have an exclusively negative affect on 
the value of their investments. It also might positively affect that value by in-
creasing their ability to make informed use of governance powers (e.g., inform-
ing their decision whether to retain or replace the firm's current directors) and 
this increased value should be offset against any negative impact of disclosure. 
My analysis does not provide for this offset, however, because for the type of 
disclosure at issue in this Article-that for which there is disclosure ambigu-
ity-disclosing would not facilitate, and indeed may well impede, informed use 
of governance powers. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (arguing 
that making this type of disclosure may well decrease transparency). 
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investors to make informed decisions. 19 In practice, though, se-
curities law in the United States requires disclosure in two con-
texts, each of which raises the temporal conflict. The first con-
text is the disclosure required in connection with the issuance 
of securities, usually in the form of a prospectus and associated 
registration statement.20 The second context is periodic report-
ing.21 
Disclosure required in connection with the issuance of se-
curities is intended to inform investors considering buying 
those securities. Therefore, the primary investor audience 
would appear to be future investors.22 This disclosure focuses 
on warning those investors of all possible material risks associ-
ated with the securities.23 The temporal conflict arises because 
such disclosure could hurt current investors. 
The temporal conflict also arises in the context of periodic 
reporting. Although the disclosure here appears to be intended 
for the benefit of all investors,24 current and future,25 disclosure 
19. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 9 (1981); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984) (arguing 
that the various sources of securities law are structured around the efficient 
capital market hypothesis). 
20. See Richard J. Morgan, Application of the Securities Laws in Chapter 
11 Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1983 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 861, 892 (stating that the first step in protecting investors through ade· 
quate disclosure is the requirement of a prospectus and registration state-
ment); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77b(1O), 77f, 77g (2000). 
21. Section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter '34 
Act] requires periodic reporting, which in practice is most often provided 
through SEC-required forms 10-K for annual, 10-Q for quarterly, and 8-K for 
defined·event reports. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West Supp. 2002). Although § 13 is 
the primary source of periodic reporting, other reporting requirements are set 
forth in Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2004); the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107·204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S. C.); and relevant state law. 
22. This appears to be the theory of the SEC's exchange decisions, dis-
cussed infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 845, 850 (D. Utah 
1995) ("The purpose of Rule 10b-5's 'omission of a material fact' language is to 
allow plaintiffs to sue companies that fail to disclose risks to potential inves-
tors."), aff'd, 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997). 
24. Periodic reporting has three statutorily stated goals: protection of in-
vestors, protection of the public interest, and ensuring fair dealing in securi-
ties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (requiring "[e]very issuer of a security 
registered pursuant to section 78l to file with the Commission, in accordance 
with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair 
dealing in the security") (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(l) (West Supp. 
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law, at least in the United States, implicitly allows firms to fa-
vor the interests of one such group of investors over another. 
Firms are afforded leeway with the timing of the required peri-
odic reporting,26 for example, and have the option to disclose 
"soft information"27 that is not required.28 Thus, any such dis-
closure (or lack of disclosure) can be phrased or timed in a 
manner that benefits one audience over the other. As a result, 
agency costs may bias this disclosure because the independent 
attorneys and underwriters who help prepare disclosure in the 
securities "issuance" context are usually not involved; instead, 
periodic reports are generally prepared by management and 
2004) (requiring "[e]ach issuer reporting under subsection (a) of this section or 
section 78o(d) [to] disclose to the public ... such additional information ... as 
the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of 
investors and in the public interest") (emphasis added); see also Linda Yi, Road 
Shows on the Internet: Taking Individual Investors for a Ride on the Informa-
tion Highway, 52 DUKE L.J. 243, 243 (2002) (noting that the SEC has adopted 
similar goals of protecting investors and promoting market efficiency). 
25. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 1997) ("A 
statement or omission is only material if a reasonable investor would consider 
it important in determining whether to buy or sell stock.") (emphasis added). 
26. See D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New Regula-
tion FD and its Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L.J. 551, 552-53 
(2002) (arguing that the '34 Act does not require a firm to disclose all material 
events as soon as they occur, therefore allowing firms some control over the 
precise timing of important corporate disclosures); see also Timely Disclosure 
of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Releases Nos. 33·5092, 34-
8995, IC·6209, 35 FED. REG. 16,733 (Oct. 29, 1970); Harvey L. Pitt, Speech by 
SEC Chairman: Fall Meeting of the ABA's Committee on Federal Regulation 
of Securities (Nov. 16, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch524.htm) (discussing the SEC's intention in periodic reporting to 
"permit an appropriate amount of flexibility in deciding what to disclose im-
mediately, and what can be deferred"). 
27. "Soft" information includes predictions and matters of opinion, as op-
posed to "hard" information which "is typically historical information or other 
factual information that is objectively verifiable." Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 
826, 830 (10th Cir. 1991); see In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 
402 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no duty to disclose soft information 
unless such information is virtually as certain as hard information). Differen-
tiating hard from soft information may not, however, always be a straightfor-
ward task. See Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: 
Will It Be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 
J. CORP. L. 69, 92 (2002) (noting that "[t]he distinction between hard and soft 
information is itself soft and opaque"). 
28. However, some soft information, such as "known material trends and 
uncertainties," is required by item 303 of Regulation S-K to be disclosed in a 
firm's MD&A. See Securities and Exchange Commission Guidance Regarding 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8350, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 
2003). 
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the firm's internal counsel, who may well be current investors 
in the firm and certainly will be sensitive to the impact of dis-
closure on firm stock value.29 
Securities law is thus inconsistent-internally and with 
corporation law30-as regards the temporal conflict. Moreover, 
it does not provide a principled basis to judge, from a temporal 
standpoint, who the appropriate investor audience should be. 
Consequences of the temporal conflict: The temporal conflict 
is of real and not merely theoretical concern.31 For example, be-
29. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures 
to Maximize Performance· Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incen-
tives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 86-88, 97-103 (2000) (discussing recent 
studies suggesting that even carefully structured pay packages inadvertently 
give CEOs incentives to manipulate the timing of disclosure for their own 
benefit, such as increasing the value of their stock options at the expense of 
shareholders). 
30. In the United States, at least, securities law's inconsistency with cor-
poration law is not problematic as a matter of positive law because securities 
law is primarily federal, whereas corporation law is state, and federal law pre-
empts conflicting state law. See, e.g., Conkling v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Es-
tabrook, & Weeden, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Mass. 1983) (noting that 
federal law has largely superseded state regulation of securities transactions). 
Nonetheless, this Article seeks a normative resolution of the temporal conflict, 
and in many nations securities and corporation law constitute a single body of 
law. See, e.g., David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot 
See: Securities Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 612, 624-25 
(1998) (observing that Australian corporate law functions in this way). More-
over, scholars argue that securities and corporation law should constitute a 
single integrated body of law in the United States. See, e.g., Ralph C. Ferrara 
& Marc I. Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporation and Federal Se-
curities Law-Santa Fe, Singer, Burks, Maldonado, Their Progeny, & Beyond, 
7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (1982) (discussing the need to develop a federal cor-
poration law to fill the gap between state corporation and federal securities 
law). 
31. This Article focuses on the temporal conflict resulting from disclosing 
risk. If firms had the same reluctance to disclose positive information as they 
have to disclose risk, a temporal conflict resulting from that reluctance might 
mitigate some of the consequences discussed below on the supposition that 
benefit to future investors from failure to disclose positive information might 
offset harm to future investors from failure to disclose risk. In reality, though, 
firms rarely withhold positive information. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 
760 (contrasting the reluctance of firms to disclose negative information with 
their willingness to disclose positive information); Marc I. Steinberg, Insider 
Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 635, 658 (2001) ("[albsent sound business reasons, 
companies normally are pleased to promptly disclose positive information"). 
For an interesting analysis of a type of temporal conflict regarding disclosure 
of positive information, see Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corpo-
rations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 987-91 (1991) (arguing that 
current shareholders would want disclosure of positive information, whereas 
future shareholders would not want disclosure of positive information until 
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cause the audience for disclosure is unclear, corporate actions 
viewed ex ante as proper are sometimes judged ex post as 
wrongful. Thus, Enron's special-purpose entity (SPE) transac-
tions were disclosed in the notes to its financial statements.32 
Although that disclosure arguably satisfied securities law stan-
dards,33 and any more prominent disclosure could have harmed 
Enron's current investors, many allege in retrospect that En-
ron's failure to give greater prominence to the disclosure misled 
future investors in Enron stock.34 
The temporal conflict creates other troublesome conse-
quences. Consider, for example, a financial institution with a 
portfolio of bad loans that is expected, once the economy im-
proves, to increase in value. Until then, however, generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) would require the finan-
cial institution, if the loans deteriorate further, to periodically' 
mark-to-market the loan value shown on its balance sheet by 
the loans' declining market value.35 If, however, the financial 
institution sells those loans to an independent special-purpose 
vehicle and takes back securities in exchange, GAAP might 
permit the institution to hold those securities without marking 
them to market.36 A financial institution may well decide to en-
after they purchase their shares). 
32. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF 
THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, 2000-01 (2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review). 
33. The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Congo (2002) (testimony of 
Frank Partnoy, Prof. of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law), at http://www 
. senate.gov/-gov_affairs/O12402partnoy.htm. [hereinafter Testimony of Frank 
Partnoy]. 
34. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a 
World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (discussing this bifurcated 
disclosure); cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An 
Economic Analysis of Dirks V. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 138-39 (1984) (tying the confusion over whether officers 
of Equity Funding of America breached their fiduciary duty by disclosing in-
formation about the firm's fraud to the different perspectives of current and 
future investors at the time of disclosure). 
35. See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ORIGINAL 
PRONOUNCEMENTS: ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1, 2004, at FAS114-
6 4J 20 (2004/2005 ed.). 
36. See, e.g., id. at FAS115 [hereinafter FASB Statement No. 115]. FASB 
Statement No. 115 classifies most equity securities and all debt securities, 
other than loans, id. at FAS115-4 4J 4, held for investment into three catego-
ries based on the intent of the investor: held-to-maturity securities, trading 
securities, and available-for-sale securities. Id. at FAS115-5 4J 12. Unlike loan 
accounting, unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are ex-
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gage in such a sale on the basis that it owes a duty to its cur-
rent investors, whose investments would be impaired if the 
loans are prematurely marked down. Government regulators, 
however, might argue that the financial institution, by engag-
ing in such a sale, has acted wrongfully and potentially harmed 
future investors.37 
Confusion over the audience similarly raises problems in 
the context of credit rating agencies,38 and indeed accounts for 
an intensely-debated conundrum of ratings reliability. Rating 
agencies are presently conservative in downgrades to avoid the 
risk of a false negative, in which downgrading the rating of 
bonds of an otherwise healthy firm can become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, hurting current investors.39 However, a rating 
agency's failure to timely downgrade, like the failure to do so in 
Enron, can significantly injure future investors and impair its 
credibility.4o For this reason, some argue that ratings should be 
based on (or perhaps even replaced by) market-based tests such 
as credit spreads which are more sensitive to the advent of 
bond risk, even though their hair-trigger sensitivity raises the 
risk of false negatives.41 
cluded from earnings. Id. at FAS115-5 ~ 13. If, therefore, the financial institu-
tion in the accompanying text intends to hold the securities it receives in ex-
change for its sale of loans as available-for-sale securities, it would not have to 
mark those securities to market. 
37. Cf. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, In re PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., Securities 
Act Release No. 8112, 78 SEC Docket 5 (July 18, 2002) (involving administra-
tive proceedings instituted by SEC alleging that bank holding company misled 
investors by selling loans to a special-purpose vehicle and taking back securi-
ties in exchange, thereby enabling the holding company to hold the exchanged 
securities without marking them to market). 
38. Rating agencies are private companies that, by reason of their reputa-
tion, are able to issue (for a fee) credit ratings of a firm's debt securities in-
forming investors of the likelihood of timely payment thereon. For a compre-
hensive discussion of rating agencies, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1. 
39. Steven L. Schwarcz, Taking Charge: Authorizing Most Credit-Rating 
Agencies Could Increase Economic Efficiency, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 13, 2003, at 
6. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: 
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 657-
59 (1999). There are, of course, many other areas where the temporal conflict 
can cause problems. One example is automobile recalls and safety alerts. Car 
manufacturers are often faced with the question of how and when to disclose 
information concerning potentially unsafe conditions in cars. Releasing more 
information (e.g., issuing recalls sooner and for "smaller" problems) would 
benefit car buyers (i.e., future owners) but could hurt current car owners by 
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This debate cannot be resolved in isolation. Current inves-
tors may prefer ratings to be conservative to protect the in-
vestment value of their securities. Future investors may prefer 
market-based tests to better anticipate the possibility of risk 
when investing in securities. Which approach is better there-
fore depends, in the first instance, on which audience is viewing 
the rating. Unfortunately, as with the other issues of disclosure 
discussed above, there is no clear understanding which audi-
ence that should be. 
Insight into the temporal conflict also provides consider-
able explanatory power for corporate governance. Consider, for 
example, the controversy over contrasting definitions of "inde-
pendence" based on share ownership, as applied to outside di-
rectors.42 Although this controversy goes beyond disclosure am-
biguity and thus does not present the classic temporal conflict 
on which this Article focuses,43 the temporal conflict informs 
the dispute. The standard view on outside director independ-
ence is that of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tion System (NASDAQ), both of which "affirmatively character-
ize shareowner ship [sic] as a relationship that does not pre-
clude a determination that a director is independent."44 Their 
rationale is that because "the concern is independence from 
management, the Exchange does not view ownership of even a 
significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independ-
ence finding."45 A more controversial and indeed unorthodox 
position on independence, however, is taken by the Sarbanes-
depressing the resale value of their cars (though even current owners would 
benefit to the extent the release protects their safety). Another example is col-
lege rankings. University administrators are faced with the dilemma of how 
and when to release potentially damaging information about their institution. 
Current students would prefer less disclosure so that the college's reputation 
and ranking will remain high, whereas future students would prefer more dis-
closure so they can better understand the risks of choosing that college. 
42. For an excellent review of this debate, see Deborah A. DeMott, Inde-
pendent Directors: Beyond Disinterest (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Minnesota Law Review). 
43. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
44. DeMott, supra note 42, at 10. 
45. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES 
303A, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf Oast visited Jan. 21, 
2005); see also Self· Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,501, 19,501-02 (Apr. 11, 2003) (providing corporate 
governance listing standards filed by NYSE). 
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Oxley Act,46 which provides that a shareholder holding as little 
as ten percent of any class of a firm's voting securities may not 
be treated as "independent" for purposes of service on an audit 
committee.47 
The temporal conflict helps to reveal the merit of Sarbanes-
Oxley's position on independence. An audit committee is re-
quired, under Sarbanes-Oxley, to be directly responsible for the 
appointment and compensation of the accountants who prepare 
the firm's audit reports and perform other audit services.48 The 
audit committee also has oversight responsibility for the exter-
nal auditor's work.49 These new responsibilities "arguably shift 
[the] focus [of audit committees] away from an orientation de-
fined in the first instance by the interests of the company's 
shareholders and toward the public-regarding orientation of ex-
ternal auditors, whose professional norms and legal duties are 
centered on assuring integrity in financial reporting."50 The 
temporal conflict provides insight into why a firm's substantial 
shareholders should not serve on the audit committee: being 
current investors,51 they will not have the same incentive as fu-
ture shareholders to ensure that the firm's financial results are 
fairly presented. 52 
Nature and scope of the inquiry: This Article focuses pri-
marily on the temporal conflict that arises in corporate disclo-
sure.53 My inquiry begins by exploring the problems caused by 
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codif-
ied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
Id. 
47. DeMott, supra note 42, at 7-8. 
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (Supp. II 2002). 
49. Id. 
50. DeMott, supra note 42, at 13. 
51. See supra note 3 (defining current investors). 
52. Cf. DeMott, supra note 42, at 13. 
[I]t's not surprising that rules regarding the composition of audit 
committees might depart ... from a focus on simply assuring inde-
pendence of directors from the company's management and might re-
flect concern that some of a company's current shareholders may be 
less than unswervingly keen that the company's financial results be 
fairly presented. 
53. Temporal conflicts also can arise in nondisclosure corporate contexts, 
see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, as well as in completely non-
corporate contexts. See infra note 114; cf. E-mail from Jill Fisch, Alpin J. Cam-
eron Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, to the author (Aug. 2, 2004) (on 
file with the Minnesota Law Review) (arguing that the temporal conflict in a 
nondisclosure corporate context may be even more acute than in a disclosure 
context, but observing that any normative resolution of the former temporal 
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that temporal conflict. I then examine relevant legal precedents 
for resolving the conflict. There are few such precedents under 
U.S. law. Because of this paucity, and also to engage the con-
flict from an international perspective, I also examine analo-
gous and foreign legal precedents. Thereafter, I analyze how 
the law should treat temporal conflicts from a more normative 
perspective. 
One must distinguish the scope of my inquiry from the 
seemingly related, though fundamentally different, conflict be-
tween the goals of long- and short-term investors.54 That con-
flict focuses on whether directors should manage "for a long fu-
ture, for expected [as opposed to present] competition, for a 
continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture."55 
Short-term investors may prefer immediate profits, while long-
term investors will prefer continuing profits. That conflict, 
however, addresses only current long- and short-term inves-
tors. 56 Thus, it is more susceptible to resolution because the 
audience is known. 
In contrast, the temporal conflict is more abstract: between 
current and future investors, irrespective of their long- or 
short-term investment intentions. This distinction is funda-
mental. For example, both long- and short-term current inves-
tors will disfavor the downgrading of a firm's bond rating. 
However, both long- and short-term future investors will favor 
it.57 Also, long- and short-term current investors will, other 
conflict would face questions about the extent to which there should be mean-
ingful regulatory limits on management discretion other than prohibitions on 
self-dealing). 
54. This fundamentally different conflict is discussed as a possible anal-
ogy to the temporal conflict. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text. 
The scope of my inquiry is also much broader than the narrow observation 
that, without securities regulation, "current shareholders [would] bear the 
costs of disclosure, yet prospective shareholders [would] share in the benefits 
of disclosure (Le., they are free riders)." STAFF OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 95TH CONG., REPORT: THE NATURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 618-56 (House Comm. Print 1977) (primarily the 
work of William H. Beaver), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. 
SCO'IT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAw AND SECURITIES REGULATION 317, 
321 (1980). 
55. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
56. For example, the literature on resolving contention between acquiring-
firm and target-firm shareholders in mergers describes this type of conflict be-
cause it is essentially between current shareholders of both firms. See, e.g., 
E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Asymmetric Information in Mergers and the Profits of 
Deceit, 28 LOY. LA L. REV. 507 (1995). 
57. Similarly, both long- and short-term current investors will disfavor 
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things being equal, disfavor disclosure of a risk; whereas both 
long- and short-term future investors will favor such disclosure. 
To distinguish these conflicts, I will refer, as needed, to the con-
flict between current long- and short-term investors as a 
"static-investor conflict," since (in contrast to the temporal con-
flict) it is a conflict among current (i.e., nonchanging) inves-
tors.58 
The analysis that follows is not driven by consideration of 
how current and future investors would solve the temporal con-
flict if they could somehow bargain. Even if hypothetical cur-
rent and future investors could agree on some particular disclo-
sure regime,59 the costs of a disclosure regime are not borne 
disclosure of a potential problem that may not arise because the disclosure 
would impair their investment value in the firm's securities; whereas both 
long- and short-term future investors will favor disclosure, which would lower 
the price of those securities. 
58. In this sense, one might think of the temporal conflict as a "dynamic· 
investor conflict" in the sense that it is a conflict between current and future 
(i.e., changing) investors. 
59. Such agreement on a disclosure regime is not an impossibility. Al· 
though the respective interests of current and future investors regarding a 
discrete disclosure decision are necessarily antithetical, to the extent today's 
"future" investors eventually purchase securities they then would become cur-
rent investors in those securities. However, agreement on a disclosure regime 
is unlikely since current investors do not necessarily become future investors, 
and at any finite future date there also necessarily will be future investors 
who have not yet become current investors. In a different context, one com· 
mentator has attempted to solve an intergenerational problem using hypo-
thetical bargain theory. See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corpo-
rate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
214, 26~7 (1999). Thomas Smith articulates the problem as a paradox: 
If markets cannot perfectly anticipate the timing of cash flows, and 
managers have information about the timing of flows superior to the 
market, then they will face decisions that in effect force them to 
choose among "generations" of shareholders.... One investment 
might yield immediate benefits, while another might payoff only 
years hence-a payoff that, if we assume imperfect markets, might 
not reflect in the current price. 
Id. at 266. Smith's methodology for solving this problem, however, appears 
somewhat disingenuous. Mter assuming that investors are all rational-itself 
a dubious assumption-he argues that "[r]ational investors are widely diversi· 
fied," and because they are widely diversified, they will be "diversified across 
all firms," and because they are diversified across all firms: 
[I]t seems likely they will be holding securities of firms whose projects 
are at all stages of their life cycles [and thus] will own some stock in 
firms investing in projects that will not be correctly valued currently 
and some stock in firms whose stock is rising only now to correct pre-
viously mistaken valuations. 
See id. at 267. These assumptions, however, assume away the underlying 
problem. 
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solely by current and future investors; there also are costs to 
firms issuing securities and to the securities markets.6o My fo-
cus is on minimizing all of those costs.6! 
1. RELEVANT LEGAL PRECEDENTS 
U.S. legal precedents: There are few judicial precedents in 
the United States, and little scholarship, addressing the tempo-
ral conflict. In general, courts have ignored the distinction be-
tween current and future investors,62 or have been sloppy when 
alluding to it. For example, the court in In re Craftmatic Secu-
rities Litigation63 cites TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 64 
for the proposition that the disclosure standard should be 
judged from the standpoint of "a reasonable investor contem-
plating the purchase of securities,"65 whereas the court in 
Grossman v. Novell, Inc. 66 cites to the same Supreme Court 
case for the proposition that the disclosure standard should be 
judged from the standpoint of "a reasonable investor ... con-
sider[ing] ... whether to buy or sell stock."67 Technically, how-
ever, the Supreme Court case stands for neither such proposi-
tion. It only holds that disclosure should be judged from the 
standpoint of what "a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider ... important in deciding how to vote"68-which, if any-
thing, is a current-investor standard since only current share-
holders can vote shares.69 
60. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing all of the inter-
ests affected by disclosure). 
61. I therefore do not delve, for example, into a Rawlsian-style examina-
tion of how a hypothetical rational investor unaware of his temporal status 
would-if given the chance--choose to order a disclosure regime to minimize 
the temporal conflict. 
62. See E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen to the author, supra note 11,at 1 
(observing that, to his knowledge, "there has never been an attempt in the ma-
teriality cases to address [the temporal] distinction" between current and fu-
ture investors). 
63. 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990). 
64. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
65. In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added). 
66. 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997). 
67. Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). 
68. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
69. I do not claim that the Craftmatic and Grossman courts were funda-
mentally wrong, merely that they were sloppy. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 231-33 (1988) (assuming that a reasonable investor could be either a 
current investor looking to sell or a future investor looking to buy, though fail-
ing to recognize that this distinction might have consequences for SEC-
mandated disclosure). 
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The only context in which U.S. authorities have focused 
with any degree of precision on the distinction between current 
and future investors is that of deli sting securities from a secu-
rities exchange. In In re Midland Resources, Inc.,70 for example, 
the SEC issued an order granting an application of the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange to delist stock and subordinated deben-
tures from that exchange. The SEC rejected Midland's argu-
ment that delisting would hurt current investors, reasoning 
that "the primary concern in situations of this sort is the pro-
tection of future investors who rely on listing as an indication 
that the securities meet the qualifications which such listing 
suggests. The adverse effect on present [securities] holders 
must yield to that."71 On this same rationale, the SEC reached 
similar conclusions in later delisting cases.72 
The SEC's rationale in these deli sting cases appears to be 
sound, based on their facts. The delisting event in all these 
cases clearly heralded the listed firm's imminent demise,73 and 
was not a technicality. Current investors at that time therefore 
already would have lost most of the value of their securities, 
with little if anything left to lose by the actual delisting. On the 
other hand, continued listing on the exchange would signal that 
the firm remained sound, thereby misleading future investors 
who could lose their entire new investment. The failure to de-
list thus would create troublesome distributional inequities 
70. 46 S.E.C. 861 (1977). 
71. Id. at 864. 
72. See In re Tassaway, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 706, 709 (1975) (stating that 
"[t]hough exclusion from the [NASDAQ quotation] system may hurt existing 
investors, primary emphasis must be placed on the interests of prospective fu-
ture investors"); In re Acme Missiles & Constr. Corp., 43 S.E.C. 485, 489 
(1967) (stating that "while delisting may have adverse effects on present in-
vestors, such effects are outweighed by the protection afforded future purchas-
ers by removing from Exchange trading securities not possessing the applica-
ble qualifications"); In re Fifth Ave. Indus. Corp., 43 S.E.C. 146, 150 (1966) 
(stating the same proposition as Acme Missiles). 
73. In Midland, the firm had suffered continuous losses totalling more 
than $42 million over a four-year period and showed no indication of a return 
to profitability. 46 S.E.C. at 863-64. In Tassaway, the firm not only failed 
NASDAQ's nominal $250,000 capital-plus-surplus requirement but also had a 
capital deficit of over $3.4 million. 45 S.E.C. at 708. In Acme Missiles, the 
firm's operating activities had effectively ceased operation. 43 S.E.C. at 486. 
And in Fifth Avenue Industries, a substantial portion of the firm's operating 
properties was condemned, with a similar impact on the firm's operations. 43 
S.E.C. at 147. 
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that, if left unchecked, could impair the reputation, and there-
fore value, of exchanges in securities markets.74 
Distinguished by the narrow factual context, the deli sting 
cases do not provide a useful framework for analyzing the tem-
poral conflict. The balance between the interests of current and 
future investors usually is much more equal than in those 
cases. Those cases also can be distinguished in that they do not 
involve disclosure ambiguity. 
Scholarship on the temporal conflict is likewise minimal. 
Professor Daniel Fischel tacitly recognized the conflict's exis-
tence as the source of confusion in Dirks v. SEC,75 a Supreme 
Court case examining, among other things, whether officers of 
Equity Funding of America breached their corporate fiduciary 
duty by disclosing information about the firm's fraud to an in-
vestment analyst. 76 The Court had held that those officers did 
not breach their fiduciary duty because their motivation was 
public spirited-to disclose the fraud-and exposure of fraud is 
a public good.77 Fischel disagreed with the Court's reasoning, 
arguing it "ignores the effects of tipping on the wealth of the 
firm's investors,"78 and that the Court should have focused on 
"the effect of [the officers'] conduct on investors' wealth [to] de-
termine whether a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred."79 
Taking that focus, Fischel observed that "it could be argued 
that the actions by Equity Funding's [officers] were causally re-
lated to the company's eventual bankruptcy, to the obvious det-
riment of its current investors."so Notwithstanding that detri-
ment, however, Fischel ultimately concluded that the officers 
did not violate their fiduciary duty because "a rule that re-
stricts the firm's ability to defraud future investors" would be-
and therefore the officers "were probably" acting-"consistent 
with the organizing principles of the firm."Sl 
The only scholarship that directly addresses at least one 
aspect of the temporal conflict is a 1991 symposium article by 
74. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolv· 
ing the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAw. 109, 124 (2004) 
(observing that "even the perception of distributional inequities can discourage 
market participants by undermining expectations"). 
75. 463 U.s. 646 (1983). 
76. Fischel, supra note 34. 
77. Id. at 138. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 139. 
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Professor Henry T.e. Hu. Investigating the process of financial 
innovation and the basic pecuniary goals of publicly held firms, 
Hu argued that such innovation has rendered "intolerably am-
biguous" the principle that corporations are to be run primarily 
for the benefit of their shareholders.82 In part, he claimed, this 
ambiguity results from increasing stock turnover, creating an 
"especially serious" timing problem where, for example, "the 
person who happens to hold shares at [the time of] disclosure of 
[a worthwhile long-term] investment does not continue to hold 
them through the payoff period for the investment."83 If, be-
cause of information asymmetry, this disclosure "has the effect 
of depressing the trading price[,] the investment would hurt 
contemporaneous shareholders and help those who hold shares 
in the future as the benefits of the investment[ ] become evi-
dent."84 Existing conceptions of the pecuniary goals of corpora-
tions "do not," Hu observed, address such "problems of conflicts 
of interest among different generations of shareholders."85 Ac-
cordingly, "[t]o the extent that securities laws allow some dis-
cretion in the timing of disclosures, managers have a basic fidu-
ciary problem in terms of which 'generation' of shareholders to 
favor."86 
Hu therefore recognized the temporal conflict resulting 
from discretion in the timing of disclosure, an aspect of the con-
flict that this Article discusses in the context of periodic report-
ing.87 He did not, however, discuss the temporal conflict in a 
wider disclosure context,88 nor did he attempt to engage the 
conflict other than identifying its existence as creating "serious 
problems because of the increasing proportion of short-term 
shareholders."89 Nonetheless, Hu's tying of the temporal con-
flict's significance to the increasing proportion of short-term in-
vestors, and thus an increasingly higher turnover of investors 
82. Hu, supra note 4, at 1286. 
83. Id. at 1287. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1287-88. 
86. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added). 
87. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
88. Although Hu agrees with me that the temporal conflict "is clearest in 
the disclosure context," he focuses in that context only on timing of disclosure. 
Hu, supra note 4, at 1300. Hu does note, however, that a temporal conflict also 
could arise in nondisclosure contexts, such as a fIrm's decisions about divi-
dends, stock buy-backs, issuance of shares, and mergers and acquisitions. Id. 
at 130Q--{)1. 
89. Id. at 1303. 
2005] TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES 1063 
in securities, may help to explain why there are so few prece-
dents. When, as in the past, 
turnover levels are low, the problem in fiduciary doctrine is less ma-
terial. Low turnover levels, in effect, provide a practical, partial solu-
tion to a fundamental problem in legal theory .... 
Unfortunately, the modern financial market is inhospitable to 
such a makeshift solution. With financial innovation playing a lead-
ing role, stock turnover has increased dramatically in the past two 
generations.90 
The increase in the turnover rate of securities held by in-
vestors therefore makes the temporal conflict an urgent prob-
lem in today's financial environment.91 Given the paucity of 
precedents, I next examine potentially analogous legal prece-
dents. 
Analogous legal precedents: The most analogous precedents 
under U.S. law are those governing the resolution of the static-
investor conflict, since that conflict, like the temporal conflict, 
involves time-related considerations. The static-investor con-
flict pits investors who generally hold securities (usually shares 
of stock) for long-term capital appreciation and income against 
other investors (especially traders) who purchase shares to 
profit short term, such as on daily market movements. 92 Short-
term investors will prefer to reap the immediate profits from 
investment, while long-term investors may prefer that firms 
forego immediate gains in favor of outlays or plans that "opti-
mize long-run firm value."93 Management therefore must de-
cide whether their duty is to maximize short-term shareholder 
value or long-term firm value.94 
Corporation law provides limited guidance for making this 
decision. A firm's directors only need "chart a course for [the] 
90. Id. at 1302. 
91. The Connection: The Director's Cut (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 
11, 2005), http://www. theconnection.org/shows/2005/01/20050111_a_main.asp. 
The turnover rate of securities also links, to some extent, the temporal conflict 
with the static-investor conflict. The lower the turnover rate, the smaller the 
difference between the identities of current and future investors, and vice 
versa. If there were no difference, the temporal conflict would disappear, leav-
ing only the static-investor conflict. 
92. See Purvis v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976); see also 
Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
93. Thomas L. Hazen, The Short-TermILong-Term Dichotomy and In-
vestment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corpo-
rate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 139 (1991) (discussing the managerial conflict 
between short-term and long-term interests). 
94. See id. 
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corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a 
fixed investment [time] horizon."95 That course is left to the di-
rectors' business judgment,96 and there is no general duty to 
sacrifice long-term corporate interests for the sake of maximiz-
ing share value in the short term.97 A firm's directors thus of-
ten will side with long-term shareholders in a hostile takeover 
context--even where doing so is not necessarily for wholly dis-
interested reasons98-by arguing that the takeover would not 
be in the best long-term interests of the firm.99 
This limited guidance does not provide insight for resolving 
the temporal conflict. The static-investor conflict, and thus any 
insight into its resolution, concerns the tension between the in-
terests of long- and short-term current investors. In contrast, 
the temporal conflict concerns the tension between current and 
future investors, irrespective of whether they have long- or 
95. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 
(Del. 1989). 
96. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (articulating 
the business judgment rule). 
97. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; cf Paramount Communications Inc. v. 
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (holding that a sale of control 
obligates directors to "focus on one primary objective-to secure the transac· 
tion offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders"); Revlon 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (hold-
ing, in the limited circumstance where a firm is for sale, that management has 
a duty to maximize short· term shareholder value). Commentators Martin Lip-
ton and Paul K. Rowe summarize the interplay between Time Inc. and Revlon 
nicely: 
In Revlon, Delaware required directors to maximize short-term value 
once they decided to sell a company for cash. Conversely, Delaware 
decided that it would not require directors to maximize short-term 
value outside this particularly narrow situation. Delaware companies 
are not required to be for sale twenty-four hours a day and seven days 
a week. Directors could agree to friendly stock mergers without put· 
ting the firm "in play" or having to "auction" the company. 
Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Profes-
sor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002). 
98. For example, Thomas Hazen has observed that: 
Corporate managers may believe that a hostile takeover attempt 
would sacrifice the long-term future of the company in favor of short· 
term profit maximization .... Permitting managers to defend against 
takeovers allows them to preserve the status quo in hopes that the 
company can continue to pursue its long-term objectives. It also per-
mits managers to keep their own jobs. 
Hazen, supra note 93, at 195. 
99. See id. at 142 (stating that "[t]arget management typically responds 
[to a hostile takeover] by resisting, claiming that it is looking out for the long-
term interests of shareholders"). 
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short-term interests.loo The dynamic of these two conflicts is 
therefore fundamentally different, as illustrated by a real-
world example. Assume that a proposed merger would create 
long-term value for a firm.IOI Current investors in the firm with 
a long-term focus would likely favor the proposed merger. In 
contrast, current investors with a short-term focus may not 
recognize the merger's long-term value. I02 Undervaluing the 
merger, these current investors might favor, say, a competing 
takeover offer that maximizes short-term share price.lo3 Under 
the law governing this static-investor conflict, the firm's direc-
tors have discretion either to choose the merger and fight the 
takeover (as desired by the current investors with a long-term 
focus), or oppose the merger and acquiesce to the takeover (as 
desired by the current investors with a short-term focus).lo4 
100. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
101. The hypothetical above also assumes that the proposed merger would 
not trigger duties under Revlon or otherwise constitute a sale of control. See 
supra note 97. 
102. See Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1148. On the question of whether current 
investors with a short-term focus should recognize long-term value, see Ber-
nard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain 
Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2002) (noting that 
"[ulnder elementary principles of finance, even short-term investors have an 
incentive to maximize the firm's long-term value, because only by doing so can 
they maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that 
short-term investors will soon want to sell"); Hazen, supra note 93, at 143 
(stating that "[ilf the current price adequately takes account of a company's 
long-term prospects, then it would make little sense to talk of long·term 
shareholders' interest as distinct from their short-term interest"); id. at 200 
(asking why the "efficient market [doesl not fairly value" the shares in ques-
tion by factoring in expected long-term prospects in addition to short-term per-
formance); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 33~2 (1990) (discussing how stock market 
myopia is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis); Mark A. Sargent, 
Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13 (2003) (suggesting that 
in a market unhampered by inefficiencies, "if the firm really was sacrificing 
the long-term interests of the corporation for short-term benefits in an unjusti-
fiable way, the market would recognize that fact and discount the price of the 
firm's securities appropriately"). 
103. See Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1148. 
104. As David Silk and David Katz have observed: 
[Elven if a hostile bid provides greater current and other short-term 
value than a merger, and even if that hostile bid provides for an ad-
mittedly fair price, the target's board may attempt to preserve or 
achieve for its stockholders the business benefits of the original 
merger transaction so long as the original merger does not itself con-
stitute a change of control. 
David M. Silk & David A. Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2003, in DOING 
DEALS 2004: KEEPING PACE WITH A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKET 1139, 1175 
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The temporal conflict, however, pits the firm's current in-
vestors, irrespective of their long- or short-term focus, against 
the firm's future investors, again irrespective of their focus. 
The entire dynamic has changed: future investors are indiffer-
ent to the merger-versus-takeover decision because, at the time 
of that decision, they do not hold the firm's securities. More-
over, at any future date on which they purchase securities, 
such investors can choose freely to purchase the firm's shares, 
if fairly valued,105 or instead to purchase other securities. In 
short, the merger-versus-takeover decision neutrally affects fu-
ture investors. Likewise, the idea of giving directors discretion 
to decide how to resolve the static-investor conflict does not in-
form the temporal conflict-it is precisely that discretion under 
existing law that gives rise to the temporal conflict. Further-
more, such discretion would be subject to agency-cost bias be-
cause directors, who often own securities of the firm, are by 
definition current investors and thus have a conflict of interest. 
Accordingly, the static-investor conflict does not provide useful 
precedents for resolving the temporal conflict. 
Precedents from foreign legal systems: The temporal con-
flict can arise in virtually any legal system. Thus it is useful to 
examine whether foreign authorities have recognized and 
grappled with this conflict. 
A line of British Commonwealth cases involving contested 
corporate takeovers has been suggested to this author by sev-
eral foreign colleagues as illustrative of the temporal conflict. 
The question in these cases was whether directors of the target 
firm breached their duty by allotting shares in the firm to third 
parties, thereby thwarting a takeover by certain current share-
holders perceived as damaging to the firm's future. Although it 
might appear that the rights of current shareholders were thus 
pitted against those of future shareholders (i.e., the firm's fu-
ture owners), these cases are better viewed as static-investor 
conflicts between competing groups of current investors, with 
directors attempting to favor the bloc of current investors that 
better serves the firm's long-term interests.106 Moreover, these 
(2004). 
105. Investors would not be expected to purchase the firm's shares, for ex· 
ample, unless they believe the stock price, as adjusted by the market to reflect 
the acquisition, is competitive. 
106. To this extent, these English common law cases are similar to the 
takeover cases discussed in connection with the static-investor conflict, supra 
notes 95-104 and accompanying text. Furthermore, these cases do not appear 
to involve any disclosure ambiguity, and, absent asymmetric information, fu-
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cases all were decided on narrow, technical grounds-in each 
case, whether the firm's directors could use their share allot-
ment power to dictate who would control the firm.lo7 The cases 
therefore do not provide a reliable, much less a principled, basis 
for balancing the interests of current and future shareholders. 
Indeed, few relevant authorities have been found concern-
ing the temporal conflict. For example, a Company Law Review 
Steering Group assigned the task of examining u.K. company 
law to suggest reforms recently proposed a concept known as 
"enlightened shareholder value," intended to encompass future 
as well as present shareholders. lOB The group's recommenda-
tions, however, are presently in limbo.109 Also, a leading Eng-
lish-law commentator, J.D. Heydon, has asserted that the 
standard for determining directors' duties, ''best interests of the 
company," means the best interests of "present and future 
members" of the company.ll0 He then supports that assertion, 
however, by arguing that "a long-term view should be balanced 
against the short-term interests of present [company] mem-
bers"-suggesting he may be conflating the temporal conflict 
and the static-investor conflict.111 
ture investors would not even be harmed by the unfavored bloc winning be-
cause the firm's share prices, and thus the cost of shares purchased by future 
investors, would fall to reflect the lowered market value. 
107. See, e.g., Harlowe's Nominees v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co. 
(1968) 121 C.L.R. 483 (High Court of Australia); Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petro-
leum Ltd. 1974 A.C. 821 (P.C. 1974) (appeal taken from Australian court to 
English Privy Council); Teck Corp. v. Millar, [1972] D.L.R.3d 288 (British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court); Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., 1 Ch. 254 (1967) (United 
Kingdom). 
108. E-mail from Brian R. Cheffins, S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate 
Law, University of Cambridge, to the author (Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with the 
Minnesota Law Review). Professor Cheffins asserts that this concept essen-
tially codifies existing u.K. case law on the duty of directors to act in the best 
interests of their firms. Id.; see also PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIE'S 
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAw 377-78 (7th ed. 2003). 
109. E-mail from Brian R. Cheffins to the author, supra note 108. 
110. J.D. Heydon, Directors' Duties and the Company's Interests, in EQUITY 
AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 120, 123 (P.D. Finn ed., 1987). This same 
viewpoint, that the best interests of the firm are those of both its present and 
future members, is taken in E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C., BD. OF TRADE, THE 
SAVOY HOTEL LIMITED AND THE BERKELEY HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED: 
INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 165(b) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1948: REPORT 
OF MR. E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C. 16 (1954). 
111. Heydon, supra note 110, at 123. Again, this same viewpoint is seen in 
E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C., supra note 110, at 16 (a firm's board of directors 
should ''balance a long-term view against short-term interests of present 
members"). To confuse matters further, another leading English-law scholar, 
commenting specifically on Heydon's assertion, observes that although "there 
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None of these authorities provides a meaningful frame-
work for analysis. I therefore begin the analysis from first prin-
ciples. 
II. ANALYSIS 
How should the temporal conflict be resolved? This is a 
normative question and requires a normative answer,l12 The 
temporal conflict reflects, at its core, an information asymmetry 
problem-the degree to which information about a firm's risks 
should be disclosed, directly or through ratings, where there is 
disclosure ambiguity.113 My analysis therefore begins by focus-
ing on the information asymmetry problem, and then considers 
the consequences of disclosure for current and future inves-
tors,l14 
Eliminating information asymmetry: The most obvious way 
to solve this information asymmetry problem is for the firm is-
suing securities (issuer) to provide investors-both current and 
future-with all possible information, thereby reducing the in-
formation asymmetry. This suggests that the temporal conflict 
could be resolved by providing maximum disclosure. In a per-
fect universe where disclosure eliminates all information 
asymmetry, there should be little difference between the audi-
ence of current investors and future investors because prIces 
have already adjusted to reflect all information,l15 
is some authority for extending [the duty of a firm's directors] to future share-
holders as well as present ones[,] I do not find that expression of directors' du-
ties particularly helpful." I.A. Renard, Commentary, in EQUITY AND 
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 110, at 137, 138. 
112. Indeed, any positive law resolution of the temporal conflict would be 
misleading to the extent it is country-specific and constrained by idiosyncra-
sies in the country's laws. 
113. Recall that the temporal conflict effectively arises only where there is 
disclosure ambiguity since a clear and credible risk must be disclosed irrespec-
tive of the impact on current and future investors. See supra notes 8-11 and 
accompanying text. 
114. One could apply this same approach to more generic temporal con-
flicts, such as automobile recalls, safety alerts, and college rankings. See supra 
note 41. The temporal conflict reflects, at its core, an information asymmetry 
problem-the degree to which information about risks associated with an en-
tity should be disclosed, directly or indirectly, where there is disclosure ambi-
guity. Only after that problem is analyzed can one take into account the con-
sequences of disclosure to current and future concerned third parties. The 
analysis therefore should begin by focusing on the information asymmetry 
problem, and then take those consequences into account. 
115. Or, in other words, markets are semi-strong efficient, reacting in-
stantly and correctly to all information as it is disclosed to the public. See, e.g., 
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That solution, however, is flawed in the imperfect universe 
in which we live. Experience shows that no disclosure regime 
can completely eliminate information asymmetry,116 Further-
more, contrary to intuition, at some point maximizing disclo-
sure does not reduce, but actually increases, asymmetric infor-
mation. This occurs for two reasons. First, disclosure of a 
profusion of details can simply obfuscate and confuse investors, 
and some investors may not even have the time to review much 
less fully evaluate the disclosure,117 Even the most sophisti-
cated investors can suffer information overload,118 This concern 
is well illustrated by a leading decision of the full court of the 
Federal Court of Australia, involving the adequacy of disclosure 
in a prospectus describing a proposed acquisition of a mutual 
insurance company and plans to demutualize it,119 Even under 
a materiality standard,120 the court rejected allegations that 
the disclosure was inadequate because it did not set forth every 
possible formulation of the commercial objective of the pro-
posal, and arguments for and against those possibilities. It rea-
soned that such comprehensive disclosure 
would be likely to confuse rather than to illuminate the issue for deci-
sion, even for people having a familiarity with corporate law and 
commerce. The need to make full and fair disclosure must be tern· 
pered by the need to present a document that is intelligible to reason-
Paul A. Ferrillo et aI., The "Less than" Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: 
Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 81, 102-03 (2004). 
116. Cf. infra note 158 and accompanying text (observing that disclosure 
regimes have failed to eliminate ambiguities). Moreover, future risks cannot 
be precisely assessed, and often are unknown. 
117. Steven E. Bocher & Samir Bukari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure 
Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, in 
SECURITIES LAw & THE INTERNET 2002: DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF 
ENRON & CURRENT SEC DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES 397, 416 (2002) (observing 
that "opt[ing] on the margin to disclose rather than not ... would result in the 
dissemination of information that could work to crowd out information of 
genuine interest to investors"); Paredes, supra note 12 (arguing that the exist-
ing disclosure system may subject investors, analysts, and other securities 
market participants to information overload); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 34 (ar-
guing that as transaction structures become more complex, the disclosure be-
comes so complex that investors may be unable to understand it). 
118. Paredes, supra note 12, at 454-55 (observing that "[s]everal studies 
and experiments show that experts can become overloaded, even if they can 
effectively use more information than non-experts ... [t]his should not be sur-
prising given that everybody-experts and non-experts alike-has limited 
cognitive abilities"). 
119. Fraser v. NRMA Holdings Ltd. (1995) 55 F.C.R. 452. 
120. Id. at 467-68. 
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able members of the class to whom it is directed, and is likely to assist 
rather than to confuse .... 121 
The court stressed that disclosure must be both practical and 
realistically useful: 
In complex cases it may be necessary to be selective in the informa-
tion provided, confining it to that which is realistically useful. ... It is 
important that the adequacy of the information provided by the pro-
spectus and supporting documents be assessed in a practical, realistic 
way having regard to the complexity of the proposal.I22 
The second reason that maximizing disclosure does not 
necessarily reduce and actually can increase asymmetric in-
formation is that-even absent a profusion of details-
behavioral psychology shows that people, and therefore inves-
tors, are not rational assessors of information. They overesti-
mate the chances that something they recently became aware 
of, like airplane crashes or illnesses, will happen.123 Likewise, 
investors may well overestimate the likelihood and impact of 
121. Id. at 468. 
122. Id. Similar arguments have been made in the United States: 
Reasonable investors do not want to know everything that could go 
wrong, without regard to probabilities; that would clutter registration 
statements and obscure important information. Issuers must winnow 
things to produce manageable, informative filings .... Their approach 
is ex ante. Issuers and underwriters must decide what information 
will be useful without burying investors under a blizzard of paper. 
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1989); 
George S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures 
Under the Federal Securities Law, in 2 SELECTED ARTICLES OF FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAw 15, 17 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991) (citing Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Cer-
tain Investment Company Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 6 Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 73,193, 62,842 n.lO, 62,846 n.23 (May 18, 1989» (observ-
ing that, as a practical matter, a firm issuing securities does not want to con-
sider all remote possibilities, and investors do not want to read overly lengthy 
disclosures). 
123. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003) (observing that people have a tendency to overes-
timate the probability that salient risks will occur, such as overestimating the 
risks of flying due to the newsworthiness of plane crashes even though car 
crashes are much more common); Christine Jolls, Behavioral- Economic Analy-
sis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1662-63 (1998) (ob-
serving that probability exaggeration may occur when an event is "available," 
or comes readily to a person's mind, with the most available events being 
those that have received a large amount of media attention); Larry E. Rib-
stein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2002) (discussing the "avail-
ability heuristic," such as the exaggerated perception of a wide range of risks, 
from corporate fraud to nuclear power accidents, given prominence in the me-
dia). 
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disclosed potential risks,124 This overestimation itself creates a 
form of information asymmetry. 125 
For these reasons, maximizing disclosure harms existing 
investors but does not necessarily benefit future investors.126 
Since maximizing disclosure is not the answer, I next examine 
more nuanced solutions, including economic theory on solving 
the information asymmetry problem, which economists often 
refer to as the "Lemons" problem. 
Economic theory on solving the asymmetric information 
problem: Economists ask how transactions ever occur if the 
seller has more information than the buyer and the information 
disparity cannot be cured (at least at reasonable cost). The 
problem was first systematically studied by George Akerlof,127 
using the crude but intuitive example of the used-car market: 
From time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the large 
price difference between new cars and those which have just left the 
showroom .... The individuals in this market buy a new automobile 
without knowing whether the car they buy will be good or a lemon. 
But [overall market statistics enable them to] know that with [a high] 
probability it is a good car and with [a lower] probability ... it is a 
lemon .... After owning a specific car, however, for a length of time, 
the car owner can form a good idea of the quality of this machine; i.e., 
the owner assigns a new probability to the event that his car is a 
lemon. This estimate is more accurate than the original estimate. An 
asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now 
have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But 
[absent a solution,] good ... and bad [used] cars must still sell at the 
same price-since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference be· 
tween a good [used] car and a bad [used] car.128 
124. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 12, at 455 (citing a "vast behavioral fi-
nance literature suggest[ing] that securities market professionals, like lay in· 
vestors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases that affect investment deci-
sions"); PETER H. HUANG, REGULATING ANxIETY AND EXCITEMENT: AFFECTIVE 
INVESTING AND EFFECTIVE SECURITIES REGULATION 54 (2002), at http://www 
.law.upenn.edulfac/pwagner/adhoclsummer2002lhuang.pdf (observing that the 
regulatory policy of mandatory disclosure can have "unintended and undesired 
consequences," such as investors overreacting to a material event that has a 
small probability of occurring). 
125. But cf Letter from Eric T. Spink to author, supra note 8 (suggesting 
"that, by exposing investors to disclosure of potential risks, investors (more 
likely, their professional advisors) will become more capable of rationally as· 
sessing those risks and the risk of over-reaction should be reduced"). 
126. To this extent, the optimal degree of disclosure is not predetermined 
by the relevant investor audience. 
127. Akerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on this 
problem. See The Nobel Foundation, at http://www.nobeLse/economicsnaure 
ates/20011 Oast modified Feb. 14, 2005). 
128. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons':· Quality Uncertainty and 
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Akerlof argues that it is up to the seller to achieve a solu-
tion to this problem of quality uncertainty: "those [merchants] 
who can identify used cars in our example and can guarantee 
the quality may profit."129 
One obvious solution is guaranties,130 such as warranties 
on the sale of goods,13l to shift the risk from the buyer to the 
seller. Other institutions that have arisen to counteract this 
problem are brand-name goods,132 chains (such as hotel and 
restaurant chains),133 and governmental and private-sector cer-
tification through, for example, licensing.134 Brand-name goods 
and chains, however, appear to be indirect guaranties made by 
placing the reputation of the goods or the chain as a hostage. If 
the goods are defective, or the chain provides inferior quality, 
the reputation suffers. Therefore, one can view the possible so-
lutions as being in two categories: protect the buyer of (in our 
context) securities either by (1) direct or indirect guaranties of 
their value or (2) governmental and/or private-sector certifica-
tion of their quality. I examine these protections in turn. 
Direct guaranties would not work to the extent that issuers 
of securities, by the very nature of securities, already make 
themselves liable to investors for repayment. 135 There nonethe-
less may be ways to create indirect guaranties, such as bonds 
or hostages to be sacrificed in the event of management exploi-
tation of the information asymmetry. An obvious approach is to 
provide for case-by-case ex post review of, and some form of 
punishment for, management exploitation of the information 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-89 (1970) (emphasis added). 
129. Id. at 496 (emphasizing that "these skills are equally necessary-both 
to be able to identify the quality of inputs and to certify the quality of out-
puts"). 
130. Id. at 499. 
131. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-315 (2003) (providing for warranties on 
the sale of goods). 
132. Akerlof, supra note 128, at 499. 
133. Id. at 500. 
134. Id. 
135. In the case of debt securities, the issuer is liable as a recourse obliga-
tion; and even equity securities give investors residual claims against the is-
suer. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation's Obligations to 
Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996). Moreover, any scheme to in-
crease the priority of equity investors' residual claims would be problematic: 
making those claims pari passu with the issuer's debt claims would dilute re-
covery on the latter, merely shifting some of the losses from the issuer's equity 
investors to the issuer's debt investors; whereas keeping the residual claims 
subordinate to debt claims would not improve the position of equity investors. 
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asymmetry (or otherwise to use ex post review as a sort of bond 
that substitutes for ex ante screening of the transaction). To 
some extent, this review is already performed by administra-
tive agencies such as the SEC (in the United States) and 
through litigation in courts. l36 In those cases, the punishment 
includes civil liability and possible criminal prosecution of 
management. l37 
An ex post approach, however, is a blunt instrument. It 
poorly filters bad actions because they will be discovered only 
after they occur. Furthermore, it creates uncertainty for, and 
imposes a chilling effect on, good actions because unlikely 
events sometimes do occur.l3S Where such events cause inves-
tors to lose money, management must. argue ex post, possibly in 
the face of adverse publicity and zealous government officials, 
that its failure to disclose that event was justifiable.139 Nor has 
136. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (describing how 
the United States has partially solved the "information asymmetry problem 
through a complex set of laws and private and public institutions that give in-
vestors reasonable assurance that the issuer is being (mostly) truthful"). Rule 
lOb-5 under the '34 Act, for example, makes it unlawful for any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) To make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) 
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2004). 
137. In the United States, securities-fraud causes of action may be crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative in nature. SEC Enforcement Activities, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 202.5(b) (2004). For an overview of possible civil, criminal, and administra-
tive actions taken in the event of securities law violations, see Alyssa Hall & 
Adam M. Schoeberlein, Securities Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 941, 985-99 
(2000), and William S. Lerach, "The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995-27 Months Later'~' Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 
(1998) (discussing class action lawsuits as a possible response to management 
exploitation of information asymmetry). 
138. C{. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 774, 
778 (2004) (observing that people tend to view past events as having been in-
evitable, and also tend in hindsight to mistake innocent or even good actions 
as misconduct); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judg-
ing in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998) (arguing that "the defen-
dant's level of care will seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in fore-
sight"). 
139. It is human nature to infer the obvious, though incorrect, cause from a 
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the existing system of ex post review and punishment yet re-
solved the temporal conflict. 
The second approach to protecting investors is to certify 
the quality of their securities, either through government or 
reputable private-sector entities. Governmental certification is 
a form of merit regulation,14o and can be expensive. In the con-
text of the original enactment of the federal securities laws in 
the United States, government certification was explicitly re-
jected as unworkable for that reason.l41 At that time, there was 
significant controversy whether a securities law should focus on 
requiring full disclosure or on imposing governmental merit 
analysis. 142 State ''blue sky" laws provided for both.143 Nonethe-
less, Congress, after "considerable debate ... decided not to fol-
low the pattern of the state acts and eschewed the idea of a 
[merit regulation] approach, opting instead for a system of full 
disclosure."144 Governmental merit regulation simply does not 
appear to be cost effective.l45 
dramatic event. ct. DON HERALD, THE HAPpy HYPOCHONDRIAC 64 (1962) (a 
humorous book in which, after surviving numerous imagined scares, a hypo-
chondriac ultimately dies of old age; but on his gravestone is written the 
words, "I told you I was no hypochondriac"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking 
Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 592 (1999) 
(arguing that ex post judicial reassessment of a troubled debtor's determina-
tion whether offered liquidity is likely to help the debtor rehabilitate may 
cause the ''liquidity [to] dry up because few liquidity providers would be will-
ing to be second guessed"); supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining why people do not rationally assess cause and effect). 
140. Indeed, at a fundamental level, government regulation and govern· 
ment certification are related concepts; the government effectively certifies as 
''legal'' only those transactions that comply with the regulation. 
141. See Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 
MICH. L. REV. 607, 615 (1964) (arguing that the "main argument for disclosure 
was that a regulatory approach was not administratively practical"). 
142. THOMAS LEE HAzEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (4th 
ed.2002). 
143. Id. at 20 (observing that "the state blue sky laws not only focused on 
providing investors with full disclosure of relevant facts, but also required that 
all securities registered thereunder 'qualify' on a merit basis, evaluating the 
substantive terms of the securities to be offered"). 
144. Id. at 21-22. Part of Congress's rationale was that a disclosure ap-
proach would avoid any implication that, by approving issuance of a security, 
the government was guaranteeing its soundness. James M. Landis, The Legis-
lative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30, 34 
(1959). 
145. There is little current literature on government certification of securi-
ties quality because, until recently, disclosure was seen as the complete an-
swer. It is not, however, entirely clear whether Congress's decision to favor 
disclosure over merit regulation reflected a fair test of the latter. The ''blue sky 
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Certification of the quality of securities by private-sector 
entities likewise does not appear to be feasible. In fact, al-
though a form of private-sector certification of quality already 
exists-the ratings system provided by nongovernmental rating 
agencies on the safety of debt securities146-it has proven inef-
fective for solving the problems caused by the temporal conflict. 
While valuable, ratings are limited. They are presently only 
given on debt, not equity, securities.l47 Ratings also do not pur-
port to certify against fraud,148 nor would it appear to be cost 
effective for rating agencies to do SO.149 Possibly for this reason, 
the rating agencies failed to predict Enron's demise, and En-
ron's debt was not downgraded below investment grade until 
days before its bankruptcy.l5o Moreover, ratings themselves are 
subject to a significant temporal conflict.151 
An indirect form of private-sector certification of quality is 
also performed by outside professionals involved in the issu-
ance of securities. Traditionally, a professional gatekeeper-
such as an independent auditor, securities analyst, investment 
banker, or, at times, a lawyer-"represents to the market ... 
laws proved to be relatively ineffective in stamping out securities frauds, espe-
cially on a national level." HAzEN, supra note 142, at 20. However, at least one 
commentator argues that such ineffectiveness "should not condemn this type 
of [substantive] control. The States had effective power only within their 
boundaries. And the amazing interstate complexity of the security business 
made action by the separate States conspicuously ineffective." William O. 
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521,531 (1934). 
146. Partnoy, supra note 41; Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 3. 
147. Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 6. Although stock analysts "certify" equity 
securities in the very limited sense of providing buy or sell recommendations, 
these are not certifications of quality per se but a balancing of quality and 
price, and often are notoriously unreliable. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy & Krishna 
G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2003, at 3,16-21. 
148. Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 6. 
149. Rating agencies do not presently have the resources, such as investi-
gative staff, to investigate possible fraud of the companies whose securities 
they are rating. Interview with John Rutherford, Jr., President and Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, Moody's Corporation, and Raymond W. McDaniel, President, 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Durham, N.C. (Duke Law School) (Sept. 24, 
2002) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). If a rating agency 
were to obtain such resources, there is concern that the greatly increased staff-
ing and size would bureaucratize the ratings process (making individual staff 
members feel less personally responsible), with unintended consequences. Id. 
Moreover, this increased staffing, along with the premium required to offset 
litigation and settlement costs resulting from failures to discover fraud, would 
significantly increase the cost of ratings, potentially undermining their eco-
nomic vitality. 
150. Testimony of Frank Partnoy, supra note 33. 
151. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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that it has evaluated the issuer's product ... [in] good faith and 
that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the 
innovation."152 Post-Enron, however; the public has lost confi-
dence, at least temporarily, in traditional gatekeeper mecha-
nisms,153 Moreover, gatekeepers may well be subject to the 
same information asymmetry to which investors are subject. 
Another indirect form of private-sector certification of qual-
ity is management's signaling, to investors, that management 
believes in the issuer. Traditionally, management does this by 
investing in the issuer's stock and by accepting stock options as 
compensation,154 This certification did not prove reliable, how-
ever, in Enron. 
Traditional economic solutions to the asymmetric informa-
tion problem thus do not resolve the temporal conflict. Accord-
ingly, this Article next seeks a second-best solution. 
Second-best solutions: Given the continued existence of an 
information asymmetry problem, I now examine whether the 
resulting temporal conflict can be minimized.l 55 Because the 
temporal conflict only arises where there is disclosure ambigu-
ity,156 one possibility is to design a disclosure system that 
minimizes the degree of ambiguity inherent in a disclosure de-
CISIOn. 
Existing disclosure regimes all have that goal, yet they 
have failed to eliminate such ambiguities. The SEC believes 
that ambiguities necessarily result from any articulated disclo-
sure standard,157 Moreover, although some regimes even pro-
vide lists of information or events likely requiring disclosure in 
an attempt to reduce disclosure ambiguity, regulators them-
selves admit that lists cannot anticipate all possible future cir-
152. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 620. 
153. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1416-17, 1420 (2002). 
154. A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAw TERMS 570--71 (Bryan A. Garner ed. 
1999). 
155. One reviewer of this Article asked if the consequenc_es to investors of 
the temporal conflict somehow could be mitigated by diversifying investment 
portfolios as a function of time. I do not see how that could be done. Even if it 
could, the transaction costs of actively achieving, monitoring, and maintaining 
such a perfectly timed investment portfolio would be high, if not prohibitive. 
156. The temporal conflict is the conflict over which audience to favor when 
there is a disclosure ambiguity. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text; 
see also supra note 113. 
157. Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A 
Call for Action, supra note 11, at 1155-56. 
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cumstances in which disclosure should occur, and do not re-
move all discretion on the final disclosure decision. 158 As a 
practical matter, therefore, some degree of ambiguity appears 
to be inherent in any disclosure system. 
The existing disclosure strategies employed in the United 
States and other nations with large securities markets do not 
directly confront that inherent ambiguity,159 Rather, these 
strategies assume there usually is a "correct" binary disclosure 
decision-disclose or do not disclose-that, with enough care, is 
ascertainable ex ante,160 That assumption, though, has given 
158. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Re· 
lease No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43, 154, and Investment Company 
Act Release No. 24,599, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'\I 86,319, 83,684 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading] (listing seven "types of information or events that should be reviewed 
carefully to determine whether they are material" in a selective disclosure con-
text but cautioning that, by listing such items, the SEC "do[es] not mean to 
imply that each of these items is per se material" and that "[t]he information 
and events on this list still require determinations as to their materiality" and 
further cautioning that the SEC "do[es] not and cannot create an exclusive list 
of events and information that have a higher probability of being considered 
material"); H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., GUIDE ON DISCLOSURE OF PRICE-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION (2002), at 3-4, http://www.hkgem.com/listingrules/ 
e_price-guide.pdf (listing sixteen events that likely require disclosure, but as-
serting that although certain items may be listed as common examples of 
price-sensitive [i.e. material] information, "no definitive list" of such items can 
be given; ultimately "[d]eciding on what information is price-sensitive is a 
matter of judgement [sic]" for company directors); U.K. LISTING AUTH., THE 
UKLA's GUIDANCE ON THE DISSEMINATION OF PRICE SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
6 (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.ukluklal2001instruments/guidance_manual_novl 
guidance2_nov.pdf [hereinafter THE PSI GUIDE] (noting that "[p]recisely what 
will constitute price sensitive [i.e. material] information will vary widely from 
company to company, depending on a variety of factors," and that conse-
quently "[i]t is therefore not possible to set out a formula for identifying price 
sensitive information that will cover all possible permutations and situa-
tions"). 
159. The United Kingdom and Hong Kong, however, indirectly confront the 
inherent ambiguity of disclosure decisions by encouraging firms that are in 
doubt about disclosure to contact the applicable securities regulator for guid-
ance. See H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., supra note 158, at 1 (encouraging 
issuers that are in doubt about disclosure to contact the exchange); THE PSI 
GUIDE, supra note 158, at 8 (stating that "[i]f a company is uncertain whether 
a matter should be announced the UKLA provides a Helpline which provides 
advice on such matters"). Even assuming this approach reduces uncertainty, it 
appears to be expensive and cumbersome. 
160. For example, some reason: 
Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact, whether in accor-
dance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud rules, the mate-
riality of that particular fact determines whether an individual or en-
tity is obligated to disclose that fact. Either the fact is material and 
must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not be disclosed. 
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rise to the temporal conflict and resulting costs discussed in the 
introduction of this Article.161 
Focusing on the inherent ambiguity of disclosure decisions, 
however, reveals a way to procedurally mitigate the temporal 
conflict. That inherent ambiguity means that, contrary to ac-
cepted doctrine, a disclosure decision is sometimes not truly bi-
nary-disclose or do not disclose-because there is no "correct" 
answer. If the decision-making process somehow could be trans-
formed into a binary process, however, the temporal conflict 
over which audience to favor when there is a disclosure ambi-
guity would be minimized. 
There is, I believe, an effective way to transform the exist-
ing decision-making process into more of a binary process: in-
corporate into the existing process a rule dictating in advance 
which way a disclosure decision should be made when facing 
disclosure ambiguity.162 Although this procedural bright-line 
rule cannot entirely eliminate uncertainty-there still will be 
cases at the margin in which the existence of disclosure ambi-
guity itself will be uncertain, thereby creating uncertainty 
whether to apply the bright-line rule163-it could dramatically 
reduce the uncertainty by rendering certain a significant por-
tion of otherwise ambiguous disclosure decisions. This rule also 
should be easy to apply since it does not purport to change the 
Heminway, supra note 11, at 1148. In the exclusive context of selective disclo· 
sure under Regulation FD, the SEC has stated it will not "second·guess[ ] ... 
close materiality judgments" or ''bring enforcement actions under Regulation 
FD for mistaken materiality determinations that were not reckless." Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 158. However, some commentators 
have suggested that recent Regulation FD enforcement actions show that, in 
practice, the SEC is, in fact, second-guessing managements' materiality judg-
ments. See John J. Huber & Thomas J. Kim, The SEC's Regulation FD-Fair 
Disclosure 4-5, 62 (2003), at http://www.lw.comlresource/publications/_pdf/ 
pub619.pdf. There may be more flexibility, however, when disclosing "soft" in· 
formation. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. 
162. I later argue that of the two ways such a rule could dictate in advance 
which way an.ambiguous disclosure decision should be made-requiring man-
agement either to: (1) disclose when in doubt, or (2) not disclose when in 
doubt-the preferred rule is the latter. See infra notes 165-96 and accompany-
ing text. 
163. In this context, I considered whether it might be appropriate to try to 
define what constitutes a disclosure ambiguity. I concluded it was inappropri. 
ate since any such definition would effectively shift the disclosure standard 
from the existing materiality standard to a new standard with its own inher-
ent ambiguities. Ct. infra note 164 and accompanying text (clarifying my in-
tent not to change existing disclosure standards). 
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current materiality standard for disclosure or otherwise affect 
substantive law; the rule merely sets a disclosure procedure 
where the current materiality standard results in ambiguity. 
The rule would not apply, for example, to a decision whether to 
disclose a sizable lawsuit against a firm for dumping toxic 
chemicals into a river (unambiguously material), nor would it 
apply to a decision whether to disclose a frivolous lawsuit such 
as one alleging the firm planted microchips in the plaintiffs 
brain (unambiguously nonmaterial). Thus, the rule is funda-
mentally different from proposals to adopt a bright-line rule for 
disclosure to replace or define the standard of materiality.164 
My proposed rule would only be justified, however, if the 
net cost of disclosure with that rule is lower than the net cost of 
disclosure without that rule, taking into account any increased 
costs imposed by the rule and any cost reductions from the 
rule's reduced uncertainty. In each case costs to current inves-
tors, to future investors, to firms issuing securities, and, to the 
extent not already taken into account, to securities markets 
should be included.165 Because the net cost of disclosure with-
out that rule is merely the net cost of the existing disclosure re-
gime, this inquiry can be restated more succinctly: a bright-line 
rule dictating in advance which wayan ambiguous disclosure 
decision should be made would be justified if the cost reduc-
tions from the rule's greater certainty exceed the rule's in-
creased costs. 
164. For discussion regarding proposals to adopt a bright· line rule for dis· 
closure to replace or define the standard of materiality, see Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 233---36 (1988) (concluding that although a "bright-line rule 
indeed is easier to follow than a standard [like materiality] that requires the 
exercise of judgment in light of all the circumstances ... [,] [a]ny approach 
that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an in-
herently fact· specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overin· 
clusive or underinclusive"); Heminway, supra note 11, at 1155-56 (comment-
ing on the SEC's recent conclusion that "any bright-line rule" for disclosure 
that replaces a materiality standard unavoidably results in over· or under-
inclusion); Herbert S. Wander, Securities Law Disclosure After Sarbanes· 
Oxley, June 2003, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAw WORKSHOP 218 (2003) (argu· 
ing that "[t]he quest for specific bright lines to define materiality is doomed to 
failure"). 
165. These categories comprise all the interests affected by disclosure. See, 
e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New 
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (2003) 
(discussing how immediate disclosure could imprecisely reduce the value of a 
firm); Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Direc-
tors in American Corporations, 46 AM J. COMPo L. 317, 333---35 (1998) (observ· 
ing that disclosure informs both current and future investors about their in-
vestment, and that markets are affected by disclosure). 
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To compare those costs, one needs to articulate the actual 
bright-line rule. There are two ways a bright-line rule could 
dictate in advance which wayan ambiguous disclosure decision 
should be made: management could be required either to dis-
close when in doubt (i.e., err on the side of disclosing) or not to 
disclose when in doubt (i.e., err on the side of not disclosing). I 
next examine which bright-line rule-erring on the side of dis-
closing or of not disclosing-has lower costs in cases of disclo-
sure ambiguity. I then analyze whether that lower-cost rule is 
justified by comparing the cost reductions from its greater cer-
tainty to the rule's increased costs. 
A bright-line rule requiring management to disclose when 
in doubt would trigger a one-time transitional market-price ad-
justment to the additional disclosed risk, hurting then-existing 
current investors.166 Although this rule theoretically would pro-
tect future investors by disclosing all ambiguously material 
risks, that protection would have to be balanced against the 
rule's recurring costs. For example, erring in favor of disclosure 
can lead to a profusion of detail that obfuscates and confuses 
future investors, making it more difficult for them to review 
and evaluate the prospectus. 167 Moreover, behavioral psychol-
ogy predicts that investors may well overreact to some dis-
closed risks,168 making future investors less likely to invest in 
the securities than if the risks were not disclosed.169 Erring on 
the side of disclosure thus would harm those future investors 
who suffer an opportunity cost by not investing in the securi-
ties.170 Furthermore, in a world of evolving international capi-
166. Future investors who subsequently become current investors should 
not be hurt since the additional disclosure made pursuant to this rule would 
have reduced the market price of the securities prior to their purchase. One 
commentator has suggested that to the extent current investors control the 
firm, perhaps they should bear this cost. In reality, however, even equity in-
vestors have only indirect control (through electing management), and inves-
tors are equally, if not more, likely to be debt investors. 
167. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing that people 
overestimate the chances that something they recently become aware of will 
happen). This cost, based on irrational overreaction, is different from the more 
rational one-time transitional market-price adjustment to additional disclosed 
risk discussed supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
169. Also, because future investors recognize that they will become current 
investors once they purchase securities, some future investors may choose not 
to invest out of concern that disclosure made during the period they would be 
current investors will depress the price of their securities. 
170. In a thick market for investment securities, this opportunity cost 
would be reduced to the extent future investors can find equivalent substitute 
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tal markets, erring on the side of disclosure may impose com-
petitive costs on the markets themselves, driving some future 
investors to invest in other, perhaps foreign, reputable markets 
with lower perceived risks.l7l Thus, erring on the side of disclo-
sure where there is disclosure ambiguity does not necessarily 
increase, but may well decrease, transparency and drive inves-
tors to other markets.172 
This conclusion is supported by finance theory. Erring on 
the side of disclosing ambiguously material risks would inject 
what Professor Fischer Black refers to as "noise" into the mar-
ket alongside information.173 In Black's conceptualization, "in-
formation" is any item of data that correctly reflects a stock's 
fundamental value,174 while "'[n]oise' is any [item of] data that 
is not information."175 Accordingly, information is useful to 
market participants for trading purposes, whereas noise is not 
useful, or worse, detrimental to profitable trading.176 
Telling the difference between noise and information can 
sometimes be difficult, especially if noise abounds. l77 Investors 
then can confuse noise with information and mistakenly "trade 
on the noise as if it were information."178 This not only causes 
investments. 
171. Erring on the side of disclosure appears more likely to drive future in· 
vestors to other markets with lower perceived risks than to cause them to de-
mand a discount; this reflects that overreaction itself is irrational, and thus 
future investors may find it difficult to price a discount. See supra note 168 
and accompanying text. 
172. Whether or not those markets presently exist, they may well exist in 
the future, especially if there is investor demand for alternative securities. 
Some investors might also invest in domestic nonsecurities investments, 
thereby weakening securities market demand. 
173. See generally Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986) (distinguish-
ing noise from information). 
174. Id. at 532-33. A stock's true value is an elusive thing, however. See id. 
("All estimates of value are noisy, so we can never know how far away price is 
from value."). 
175. Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 713, 718 (1995). 
176. Black, supra note 173, at 529. 
177. Id. at 534. 
178. Id. at 529, 531, 534. In a sense, noise mimics information and com-
petes antagonistically with it for investor attention. Additionally, some inves· 
tors may trade on noise for the simple reason that "they like to do it." Id. at 
534. Some noise theorists "postulate that a substantial portion of traders in 
the market are irrational, in the sense that they suffer testable cognitive bi-
ases that impede their collective ability to coldly calculate the intrinsic value 
of securities." Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM 
and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO 
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markets to become less efficient,179 but creates a risk that mar-
ket-pricing errors "will be cumulative, in the same sense that a 
drunk tends to wander farther and farther from his starting 
point."180 
Applying Black's formulation to the temporal conflict, risks 
that are ambiguously material include both noise and informa-
tion. Disclosing those ambiguously material risks, therefore, 
would introduce into the market both noise that looks like in-
formation and information that looks like noise.181 Investors 
then would have difficulty distinguishing noise from informa-
tion, and could mistakenly trade on the noise in the incorrect 
belief it is information. The result would be that securities 
markets become less efficient and subject to cumulative pricing 
errors. 
Even worse, disclosing ambiguously material risks may ac-
tually exacerbate the temporal conflict. This results because 
noise trading can increase investors' focus on the short term, 
and thus bring about more volatile markets: "noise traders may 
overreact to information, thus forcing inordinate attention on 
short-term performance and increasing volatility."182 Short-
term investment focus and market volatility increase the secu-
rities turnover rate,183 which in turn increases the impact of 
L. REV. 475, 478 (1997). As noise increases, these traders have more chances 
to focus on extraneous data that has emotional appeal but little actual utility 
from a valuation standpoint and commit valuation errors that, when aggre-
gated, cause inefficient pricing of shares. Id. ("Because noise traders act on 
psychological impulse (,noise') rather than true information, their trading 
tends to drive stock prices away from best estimates of fundamental values."). 
179. Black, supra note 173, at 532. 
180. Id. 
181. Even those in the best position to know the difference-a firm's offi-
cers and professional advisors-will have difficulty separating the informa-
tional wheat from the noisy chaff when risks are ambiguously material; if it 
were otherwise, the materiality of such risks would not be ambiguous. It also 
has been suggested that mandatory disclosure in general has the effect of gen-
erating vast amounts of noise but very little information. See Mahoney, supra 
note 175, at 742 ("Although the mandatory disclosure system may produce lit-
tle or no information, it produces noise in mind-boggling quantities."). 
182. Hazen, supra note 93, at 157. When the amount of noise trading in-
creases, markets become increasingly liquid. Black, supra note 173, at 532. 
Increasing liquidity to the point it becomes excessive effectively promotes 
short-term speculation and volatility. See Mahoney, supra note 175, at 728 
(summarizing an argument made by Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. 
Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Se-
curities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 268 (1989». 
183. See Summers & Summers, supra note 182, at 269 (noting that "fre-
quent trading is the essence of' short-term speculative trading strategies that 
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the temporal conflict.184 Moreover, short-term investment focus 
may cause other undesirable consequences.l85 
For these reasons, a bright-line rule erring on the side of 
disclosure where there is disclosure ambiguity would be costly, 
could lead to market inefficiency, and may even exacerbate the 
temporal conflict. 
In contrast, a bright-line rule requiring management not to 
disclose when in doubt would neutrally affect the value of cur-
rent investors' securities other than triggering a one-time tran-
sitional price adjustment.l86 Although this rule marginally 
might increase risk for future investors due to the possibility 
that an undisclosed risk later turns out to be material, those 
investors presumably would discount for this increased risk. 187 
increase volatility and that depend upon excess liquidity for their viability). 
184. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the tempo· 
ral conflict as an even more urgent problem because of the increase in the 
turnover rate of securities held by investors). 
185. Short· term investment focus may negatively affect the economy itself: 
Short·termism as the driving force of investing is, however, highly de· 
structive .... Short· term investing pressures managers to engage in 
short· term management, damaging the future prospects of the corpo· 
ration with promiscuous layoffs, inadequate funding for research and 
development, environmental pollution and substandard production 
quality. Short· term investing drives managers to manage earnings, 
not business. Only by managing earnings can most corporations con· 
sistently satisfy a short· term market's demand for constantly increas· 
ing stock prices. Also, managing earnings instead of businesses in reo 
sponse to the short· term pressures of the market ... leads managers 
to mislead investors, sometimes, as we have recently seen, crossing 
over the line into gross illegality. 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes·Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corpo-
rate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1209-10 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
Other commentators have expressed similar concerns. See Hazen, supra note 
93, at 179 (noting that many commentators "have suggested that corporate 
managers' obsession with short· term shareholder wealth maximization has, in 
many cases, diverted their attention away from the efficient operation of their 
companies"); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corpo· 
rate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
187, 210 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he focus on the short term has come at the 
expense of the long· term planning, investment and business development of 
the corporation," and that "corporations have sacrificed research and develop· 
ment expenses, capital expenditures, market development, and new business 
ventures, simply because they promise to payoff only in the long term"). 
186. See supra note 14 (observing that although disclosure of an ambiguous 
risk could alert current investors to the possibility of opting out of their in· 
vestment based on the risk disclosed, most of those investors would not benefit 
since the disclosure would reduce the sales price (i.e., value) of their securi-
ties). Erring against disclosure, however, may trigger a one-time transitional 
market adjustment in prices reflecting the discount next discussed. 
187. This so-called "lemons" discount arises wherever a purchaser (in our 
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Any such discount should be minimal, since it reflects only 
marginally increased risk, and also would result in only a one-
time transitional market-price adjustment since, after initial 
price adjustment, the discount would be embedded in both the 
purchase and sale price of the securities. Future investors also 
would benefit from this rule as to risks first arising after they 
become current investors. Additionally, the rule would reduce 
at least the perception, if not the reality, of agency costs for 
those members of management tempted to err against disclo-
sure absent the rule. 188 Although some agency cost would re-
main to the extent managers may be tempted, at the margin, to 
decide that a given disclosure decision is ambiguous to avoid 
disclosing,189 ex post review and punishment could limit most 
abuse.19o How the rule would affect the market for securities 
ultimately is an empirical question. Some investors, for exam-
ple, might try to find alternative markets that offer more in-
formation about ambiguous risks. However, even those inves-
tors may be deterred by the cost of assessing those risks. 
Furthermore, as described in the prior paragraph, investors 
may well prefer to invest in markets with lower perceived risks. 
case, investor) has less information about what is being purchased than the 
seller (in our case, issuer). See Akerlof, supra note 128, at 488-89. 
188. See supra text accompanying note 29 (arguing that agency costs may 
bias disclosure prepared by a firm's management and internal counsel, with-
out independent professional gatekeepers). 
189. Cf supra note 163 and accompanying text (observing that a bright-
line rule cannot eliminate uncertainty). This temptation might arise, for ex-
ample, where disclosure of a risk would negatively impact management's com-
pensation, such as where compensation is strongly tied to share price. 
190. The existence of a disclosure ambiguity is objectively determinable 
and should be subject to ex post review by a regulator or a court. If that review 
treats management's finding of a disclosure ambiguity as a presumptively con-
flicted decision, to which no deference is due-as opposed to treating it as 
business judgment, to which considerable deference is due-agency costs 
would be greatly mitigated. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, 
Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy 
in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1199 
(1999) (lin~ing managerial discretion with agency costs); Robert Dean Ellis, 
Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. 
REV. 399, 402 (1998) (linking the "problem[ ] of managerial discretion" with 
agency costs); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A 
Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 42 (2002) (referring to "the potential for 
agency costs" in a takeover context as "the reason for restraining [manage-
ment's] discretion"); Larry Lang et al., Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the 
Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 4654, 1994) (linking agency costs with managerial discre-
tion in use of funds from asset sales). 
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A bright-line rule requiring management not to disclose 
when in doubt therefore appears to be the lower-cost, and thus 
preferred, strategy. Accordingly, I next compare that rule to the 
existing disclosure regime, by examining whether cost reduc-
tions generated from that rule's reduction of uncertainty exceed 
any increased costs imposed by the rule itself. 
This bright-line rule-erring against disclosure in cases of 
disclosure ambiguity-should generate significant cost reduc-
tions. Because existing disclosure strategies assume the disclo-
sure decision is ascertainable ex ante with enough care,191 
management must make exquisite and nuanced decisions, often 
requiring the help of highly paid professionals. 192 If manage-
ment decides incorrectly, there can be significant liability,193 
That potential liability, and the need to insure against it, im-
poses further costs. A bright-line rule erring against disclosure 
in cases of disclosure ambiguity would greatly reduce these 
costs because it would make disclosure decisions simpler and 
more straightforward while simultaneously reducing the 
chance of liability. 
191. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
192. HAzEN, supra note 142, § 3.2 at 127 (observing that firms often retain 
special outside securities counsel to supervise the preparation of their SEC 
prospectuses). Since the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(part of which requires executive certification of each annual and quarterly 
report), the hiring of outside securities counsel has increased because firm ex-
ecutives are fearful of personal liability. See SWIDLER BERLIN SHEREFF 
FRIEDMAN LLP, CORPORATE UPDATE: CEO AND CFO CERTIFICATIONS AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE CONTROLS (2002) (on file with the Minnesota Law 
Review) (discussing recommendations for firms attempting to comply with 
Sarbanes-Oxley). For some firms, the annual cost of outside securities counsel 
exceeds $1 million. Michael Murray, CFOs Say Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance 
Presents Challenges, MBA NEWSLINK, Sept. 18, 2003, at http://www_mortgage 
bankers.org/cmnewslinklissues/2003/09118.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2005). 
193. In the United States, for example, the firm itself, as issuer of the secu-
rities, is strictly liable for a wrong disclosure decision. HAZEN, supra note 142, 
§ 7.4 at 357. Members of management will also be liable unless they can estab-
lish an appropriate due diligence defense. Id. § 7.4[2) at 359. Although that 
defense theoretically requires "the highest standard of care," id. § 7.4[2)[A)[l) 
at 359, "the courts have not been able to articulate ... the requisite standard 
of care." Id. § 7.4[3) at 366. That inability creates uncertainty and potential 
liability. Indeed, one commentator argues that "[t)o a large extent, BarChris 
[, the seminal case on this due diligence defense,) may be viewed as treating 
'inside' signatories [to a registration statement, required for publicly-issued 
equity securities,) in effect as guarantors of the accuracy of the registration 
statement." STEINBERG, supra note 16, § 6.04 at 162. Underwriters who help 
to sell the securities, and to some extent even professionals involved in the 
preparation of the prospectus and other sales materials, also can be liable. 
HAzEN, supra note 142, § 7.3[3) at 350. 
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This bright-line rule would reduce costs even further by 
minimizing the amount of detail in the prospectus, thereby 
making it easier to review the prospectus and minimizing in-
vestor confusion. The rule also would minimize opportunity 
costs where risks never materialize but their disclosure causes 
investors to overreact and not invest. And, of course, the. rule 
would minimize the temporal conflict and its resulting devalua-
tion of current investors' securities. 
Although this bright-line rule would impose costs, they ap-
pear to be modest compared to the rule's cost reductions. One 
such cost is that risks as to which there is disclosure ambiguity 
will not be disclosed to future investors, thereby exposing those 
investors to marginal undisclosed losses. As discussed, how-
ever, future investors should not be harmed because they can 
compensate by discounting for this risk.194 The rule also should 
have relatively little impact on the integrity of securities mar-
kets: neither existing disclosure strategies nor the bright-line 
rule assures future investors that all risks will be disclosed, 
and the difference in disclosure is limited to those risks as to 
which there is disclosure ambiguity.195 
194. See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text. 
195. Because my proposed bright·line rule pertains to disclosure ambigu-
ity, it would not have materially affected investor losses in Enron. Fraud 
and/or investor failure to read footnotes-not disclosure ambiguity-was the 
underlying problem in Enron: 
[Investors] could have had a heads-up that all was not quite right at 
[Enron] long before the bad news broke in October. The source of this 
information? The footnotes companies are required to publish with 
their financial statements .... Footnotes do not make for easy read-
ing, however, and the numbers are often difficult to decipher. 
Anne Tergesen, The Fine Print: How to Read Those Key Footnotes, Bus. WK., 
Feb. 4, 2002, at 94,94-95; see also Testimony of Frank Partnoy, supra note 33 
(observing that an argument can be made "that Enron satisfied its disclosure 
obligations" even though "the result of Enron's method of disclosure was that 
investors did not get a clear picture of the firm's finances"). This neutral effect 
does not undermine this Article's argument, which is comparative--namely, 
that the bright-line rule is not costless, merely less costly than the existing 
disclosure regime. The occasional "Enron" may well be a cost of any system. 
Nonetheless, the bright-line rule might have mitigated losses by making po-
tential Enron investors, knowing they are not receiving all information, more 
skeptical. And, to the extent Enron resulted from investor failure to read foot-
notes, it is less likely to be repeated. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitiza-
tion Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L_ REV. 1539, 1556 n.87 (2004) ("Post-Enron, no 
reasonable investor can claim ignorance of financial statement footnotes; in-
vestors have been widely educated to carefully review those footnotes as part 
of their investment or credit decisions."). 
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On balance, therefore, a bright-line rule erring on the side 
of not disclosing appears to manage disclosure ambiguity at 
lowest overall cost to current and future investors, issuers, and 
markets, and thus best resolves the temporal conflict. 
This rule, moreover, may have significance beyond the 
temporal conflict. A bright-line rule erring against disclosure in 
cases of ambiguity can help to resolve the ongoing broader de-
bate over how to minimize the ambiguity of disclosure in secu-
rities law generally.196 Such ambiguity is regarded as a major 
flaw in the existing securities disclosure regime.197 Although a 
196. Several commentators have offered recommendations for minimizing 
disclosure ambiguity. See Heminway, supra note 11, at 1191-1211 (proposing 
materiality guidance designed to reduce disclosure ambiguity in insider trad-
ing context); see also id. at 1155 n.83 (citing COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF 
SEC., AM. BAR Assoc. SECTION OF Bus. LAw, REPORT ON REGULATION FD 
(2002), at 4-5, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000/reports/ 
20020206000000.pdf (suggesting approaches intended to reduce disclosure 
ambiguity in Regulation FD context»; Wally Suphap, Getting it Right Versus 
Getting it Quick: The Quality-Timeliness Tradeoff in Corporate Disclosure, 
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 661, 710 (suggesting that "[i]n order to alleviate the 
ambiguities inherent in materiality judgments, the SEC could consider adopt-
ing bright line standards with well-defined and objective triggering events") 
(footnote omitted); Shannon M. Mudd, Note, The Missing Piece of the Mosaic: 
Improving Regulation FD, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 971, 992-95 (2002) (proposing 
replacement of current materiality standard in Regulation FD context). 
Heminway notes, however, that "[a]ttempts to more clearly define materiality 
for various federal securities law purposes ... have failed." Heminway, supra 
note 11, at 1153; see also Wander, supra note 164, at 218 (stating that in a 
Regulation FD context, "[i]f the SEC did provide more guidance on materiality, 
I fear it would only enlarge materiality and cause more confusion and uncer-
tainty"). 
197. See Heminway, supra note 11, at 1139-40 (arguing that "the current 
legal standard [governing materiality] is inadequate"for transaction planning 
and judicial decision-making," and suggesting that it facilitates "allegations 
that there has been a failure of adequate disclosure, even with thoughtful ad-
vance planning"). Heminway further argues that "[t]he high degree of impreci-
sion inherent in this [materiality] standard not only creates legal uncertainty 
and headaches (sometimes nightmares) for transaction planners, litigants, en-
forcement agencies, and courts, but also is inessential to (and potentially dis-
tracts from) achievement of the basic policy goals underlying" various aspects 
of securities regulation. Id. at 1140. Regulation FD in particular has brought 
urgency to the problem of ambiguous materiality, though in this context mate-
riality determines not what must be disclosed but rather what must not be se-
lectively disclosed. See id. at 1139 n.28 (quoting Jason Michael Craft, What's 
All the Commotion?: An Examination of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 119, 156 (2001) (stating that "[o]ne 
of the largest failures of Regulation FD is the SEC's lack of any meaningful 
guidance or direction as to what information will ... be considered material"»; 
see also Mudd, supra note 196, at 986 (observing that "[s]ince the adoption of 
Regulation FD, commentators most frequently criticize the vague materiality 
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complete discussion of that debate is beyond this Article's 
scope, nothing in this Article would prevent the proposed 
bright-line rule from being applied to all disclosure ambiguities 
to reduce uncertainty. Indeed, that broad application is implic-
itly assumed since the temporal conflict can arise in the context 
of any disclosure ambiguity. 
CONCLUSION 
Described as a "fundamental problem in legal theorY,"198 
the temporal conflict-the anomaly that disclosure of ambigu-
ous risks harms a firm's current investors, whereas failure to 
disclose these risks may harm the firm's future investors--can 
arise wherever there is disclosure ambiguity.199 This conflict 
causes corporate actions that are viewed ex ante as proper 
sometimes to be judged ex post as wrongful, exposes financial 
institutions to possible liability, undermines the credibility of 
credit rating agencies, and misleads investors. As the world 
shrinks through global investment and information exchange, 
markets that have managed the temporal conflict will become 
increasingly competitive and valued by investors. 
There are, however, few relevant legal precedents or au-
thorities discussing the temporal conflict, and none that pro-
vides a conceptual basis for analysis. 2oo This Article therefore 
engages in a fundamental inquiry, examining the temporal con-
flict as a problem of asymmetric information but finding that 
traditional law and economic solutions are inadequate.2oi The 
Article then seeks second-best solutions, concluding that a pro-
cedural bright-line rule-erring against disclosure in cases of 
standard"). 
198. Hu, supra note 4, at 1302. 
199. See supra note 41 (discussing how temporal conflicts could arise in the 
contexts of automobile recalls, safety alerts, and college rankings). 
200. The apparent mystery of why there are so few precedents may be ex-
plained by the fact that historically low turnover levels in holdings of securi-
ties muted the conflict's significance; only in recent years, with financial inno-
vation dramatically increasing turnover levels, has the temporal conflict 
become an urgent and important problem. See supra notes 89-91 and accom-
panying text. 
201. These solutions are inadequate because maximizing disclosure of risks 
does not always reduce, but sometimes actually increases, asymmetric infor-
mation. This is because investors are not always rational assessors of informa-
tion; they may well overestimate the likelihood and impact of disclosed poten-
tial risks, just like people generally overestimate their susceptibility to 
recently-heard risks like airplane crashes and illnesses. This overestimation 
itself creates an information asymmetry. 
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ambiguity-would help resolve the temporal conflict and also 
would be less costly to investors, issuers, and markets than ex-
isting disclosure strategies. Because this rule derives from a 
normative analysis, and nothing in that analysis turns on U.S. 
law,202 the rule should have applicability not only in the United 
States but also in foreign legal systems. 
In deriving this rule, I recognize that a procedural bright-
line rule erring against disclosure in cases of ambiguity would 
reduce uncertainty, whether or not there is a temporal conflict. 
Application of the rule to all disclosure ambiguities, which is 
implicitly assumed in this Article, therefore could help resolve 
the broader debate over how to minimize the ambiguity of dis-
closure in securities law. 
One nonetheless might question the political viability of a 
procedural bright-line rule erring against disclosure. After all, 
such a rule runs counter to the momentum of securities law de-
velopment worldwide, which has moved towards increasing dis-
closure.203 The response, of course, is that this bright-line rule 
202. Although I assume a "materiality" standard for disclosure, as under 
U.S. law, most foreign legal systems follow the same or a similar disclosure 
standard. See, e.g., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (IOSCO) TECHNICAL COMM., 
PRINCIPLES FOR ONGOING DISCLOSURE AND MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT 
REPORTING BY LISTED ENTITIES 3 (Oct. 2002), http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/ 
pdflIOSCOPDI32.pdf (reporting that "[i]n spite of the different [disclosure] 
approaches used, most jurisdictions agree that listed entities should have an 
ongoing obligation to disclose information that would be material to an inves-
tor's investment decision and that is necessary for full and fair disclosure"); 
IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL DISCWSURE STANDARDS FOR CROss-BoRDER 
OFFERINGS AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS II-2-II-9 (Sept. 1998), 
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD81.pdf (showing materiality stan-
dards used in 1998 by Australia, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mexico, Ontario, Quebec, Switzerland, and the United States); Simon Wong, 
Materiality and Timeliness, Address Before the Second Meeting of the Eura-
sian Corporate Governance Roundtable 2 (June 7, 2001), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecdl60114/2353282.pdf (observing that "many countries utilize the con· 
cept of materiality to determine the minimum amount of information that 
must be disclosed by a company"). Different nations, however, may judge "ma-
teriality" in slightly different ways. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trad-
ing Regulation-A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT'L LAW. 153, 163 (2003) (ob-
serving that, at least in the insider-trading context, "the U.S. standard [of 
materiality], analyzing whether the affected information would assume sig-
nificance to the mythical 'reasonable' person in making her investment deci-
sion, has not been accepted with frequency elsewhere," and noting that the 
predominant alternative considers "the information's impact on the market 
price of the affected security"). 
203. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., U.K. LISTING AUTH. SOURCEBOOK OF 
RULES & GUIDANCE Rule 9.1 (2004), http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/uklalchapt09-
3.pdf (imposing a duty on listed firms to disclose immediately information 
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only would apply in cases of disclosure ambiguity,204 where ad-
ditional disclosure does not necessarily increase but, as ex-
plained, may well decrease transparency.205 At the same time, 
the rule would make local securities markets more competitive 
with reputable foreign markets that have lower perceived 
risks.206 As a practical matter, moreover, the rule should be 
easy to implement because it "preserves the existing legal 
analysis [for disclosure, i.e., materiality,] but at the same time 
presents better guidelines for transactionallawyers.''207 
likely to have an impact on the share price). The Financial Services Authority 
is an independent nongovernmental body given statutory powers by the U.K.'s 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., WHO WE 
ARE, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/uklalLlistinginf04.html (last visited Jan. 30, 
2005). For more information regarding the international trend toward increas-
ing disclosure, see AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, HEARD IT ON THE 
GRAPEVINE 13 (1999), http://www.asic.gov.aulasic/pdflib.nsflLookupByFile 
Name/analysts_briefmgs.pdfl$file/analysts_briefings.pdf (proposing as a "guid-
ing principle [that] if there is any doubt about whether particular information 
is material, the safest course of action is to make a public announcement 
through the stock exchange"); CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, 
NATIONAL POLICY 51-201 DISCLOSURE STANDARDS (2002), http://www.cvmq 
.comlenlinitie/pdfl51-201ang.pdf (recommending, as a "guiding principle, [that] 
if there is any doubt about whether particular information is material, we en-
courage companies to err on the side of materiality and release information 
publicly"); Martha Mahan Haines, Disclosure in the Municipal Market: Fun-
damental Concepts for Issuers, Address Before the Michigan Municipal Fi-
nance Officers Association (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
Ispch400.htm (advising, in cases of disclosure ambiguity, that "[i]f safety is 
your concern, when in doubt, disclose"); Richard Williams, FSA's Disclosure 
Regime for Listed Companies, Presentation to Public Relations Firms (Jan. 25, 
2002), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp90.html (urging "companies to 
consult with their advisers whenever they are uncertain, and to err on the side 
of caution if there is any residual doubt about the need to issue an announce-
ment"). But cf supra note 12 (noting that, according to Professors Langevoort 
and Paredes, MD&A disclosure requirements under U.S. securities law dis-
courage excessive disclosure). 
204. This point-that the proposed bright-line rule would apply only in 
cases of disclosure ambiguity--cannot be over emphasized. One highly sophis-
ticated reviewer of this Article, who will remain unnamed, in detailed and oth-
erwise thoughtful comments (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) ob-
served an intended contradiction of my choice of bright-line rule: "It seems 
that disclosure is generally the way to go ... for issuers who have no ambigu-
ous risks to disclose." My proposed bright-line rule, however, reaches that pre-
cise result because it assumes, as under current law, that all unambiguous 
risks will be disclosed. 
205. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
207. E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen to the author, supra note 11,at 2; see 
also James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for 
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 
1046, 1048 (1989) (quoting Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Af-
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firmative Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Framework for Merger Nego-
tiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 929 (1987) (ob-
serving that the existing legal analysis for disclosure "creates difficult counsel-
ing situations and liability concerns, particularly given that any adjudication 
will be determined with hindsight"». 
